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The scheme you consider is the original ElGamal signature. This scheme is known to be existentially forgeable. By definition, a valid original ElGamal signature on a message $m \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ is a pair $(r,s)$ satisfying $g^m \equiv y^r \cdot r^s \pmod p$. With $r = g^e \cdot y^v \bmod p$ and $s = -r\cdot v^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$ for random integers ...


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This is not an answer; rather, I attempt to improve the method outlined in the question. Problem statement (slightly simplified): it is given an RSA public key $(N,e)$ with $2^{n-1}<N<2^n$, $n=2048$, $e=41$, a hash function $H=\operatorname{SHA-1}$ with output of $w=160$ bits. It is asked an $(m,s)$ with $0\le s<N$ and $H(m)=(s^e\bmod N)\bmod2^w$. ...


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Existential forgery attacks allow the attacker to choose (or calculate) a signature, and then the message is derived from this signature (and the public key) using the existential forgery attack algorithm. The signature is valid for the derived message, but the problem is that the attacker cannot control the message. It could be anything. Hashing the ...



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