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AES-GCM has the following problems: In the case of nonce reuse both integrity and confidentiality properties are violated. If the same nonce is used twice, an adversary can create forged ciphertexts easily. When short tags are used, it is rather easy to produce message forgeries. For instance, if the tag is 32 bits, then after $2^{16}$ forgery attempts and ...


6

Before answering your questions: GCM is an authentication encryption mode of operation, it is composed by two separate functions: one for encryption (AES-CTR) and one for authentication (GMAC). It receives as input: a Key a unique IV Data to be processed only with authentication (associated data) Data to be processed by encryption and authentication It ...


6

AEAD modes like GCM are authenticated encryption with associated data; this setting only affects the associated data half of that. The ciphertext itself is still authenticated. The associated data portion is there to provide contextual information for the authentication of the ciphertext. Usually this data is something that's outside of direct control of the ...


5

I suppose one of the problems (they mention several after a short reading) with a mode like GCM is nonce misuse (e.g. reuse). When the key is the same and the nonce is reused, by misunderstanding the concept or by a simple programming error, information about the plain texts can be revealed. Phillip Rogaway has already defined an encryption mode (SIV, ...


4

Well, $\operatorname{GHASH}$ might be better understood as the polynomial: $$\operatorname{GHASH}_H(X_1, X_2, ... , X_{m-1}, X_m) = X_1 H^{m} + X_2 H^{m-1} + ... + X_{m-1} H^2 + X_m H^1$$ where addition, multiplication and exponentiation are in the field $GF(2^{128})$. These addition, multiplication and exponentiation operations act algebraically quite a ...


3

CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) Message authentication (via CBC-MAC) is done on the plaintext not the ciphertext. (This is generally not a desireable feature.) On the encrypt operation, the encryption and MAC could happen in parallel, but generally do not (typically because there is just one AES engine in a chip, just one AES thread at a time, etc.). Similar ...


3

Unless you are absolutely sure that you don't need to and that the cost is going to be significant then I would absolutely say you should use authenticated encryption. One reason is bit-flipping attacks - flipping a few bits at the 'right' point in your encrypted message might lead well to a message that is legal (the classic example is if someone learns ...


3

No it is not less secure. GCM and a number of other authenticated modes typically let you specify optional data which is authenticated but not encrypted. That is all this is. So the code is making it explicit that there is no data that is only authenticated.


3

GMAC is quite simply GCM mode where all data is supplied as AAD (or additional authenticated data), or as NIST SP 800-38D puts it: If the GCM input is restricted to data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC, is simply an authentication mode on the input data. If you don't have access to a cryptographic provider ...


3

A message encrypted with AES-GCM can be decrypted with an AES-CTR library IF the authentication tag is stripped from the message. If you are encrypting with AES-GCM and then adding an HMAC tag, you need to strip the HMAC and the GTAG off the message in order to decrypt it, assuming the IV section of the message is in the correct location for each library to ...


2

Well, the GCM tag can be rearranged as $Tag = (Len(C, A) \times H) \oplus \textit{Other Stuff}$; if the length of your ciphertext (and additional authentication data) is consistent, you could precompute $Len(C, A) \times H$, and xor that in along with everything else in the final step. One note: the (add/multiply) that you do in cycle 6 has the side effect ...


2

That might not be speed-efficient, but for educational purpose it is possible to implement the CTR internals manually, by using the ECB mode of CNG: Set the Algorithm mode: BCryptSetProperty(hAesAlg, BCRYPT_CHAINING_MODE, (PBYTE)BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_ECB, sizeof(BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_ECB), 0) Encrypt all blocks the IV with counter with the key hKey: ...


2

With concatenation the caller only has to ensure the nonce is unique. For example they can use a counter that increments for each message. Incrementing a counter for each message is convenient in many scenarios, including encrypted network transports like TLS. If you use xor or add nonce and counter you get overlaps, so a counter as nonce would be fatally ...


2

Should the external nonce passed to GCM be authenticated separately when passing over network? No, that is not necessary; it is implicitly authenticated by GCM itself, pretty much as the AAD is also authenticated. That is, if someone in the middle modifies the nonce, then that will alter the authentication tag that the decryptor computes as a part of ...


2

I did some more research and yes it does include both AD length and ciphertext length, so is not vulnerable to a length extension attack as length is part of GCM GHASH. Based on NIST SP-800-38D (PDF) page 18 len(A) and len(C) are both part of the input into the GHASH function. And double-checked this in an implementation gcm_finish method: both lengths are ...


1

If you are constrained by the embedded environment, you should consider CCM instead of GCM as AES mode. One of the major constrain when implementing GCM is that the authentication part (the GHASH) is totally unrelated to AES and should be implemented in its own way. And, to make it reasonably fast, you have to use key-depended look up tables which will ...


1

GCM is a stream cipher -- it encrypts using CTR mode, which turns a block cipher primitive into a stream cipher. Additionally, GCM is an AEAD mode, which means the authentication is nicely built in (so you don't have to worry about how to handle it, because the mode itself specifies how to do it in a secure way). The IV does not need to be secret. However, ...


1

BouncyCastle (for Java) has code that performs the AAD processing anywhere in the stream. It does however require modular exponentiation and additional multiplication. GCM mode officially requires the AAD to be processed before the plaintext, but as stated, there is a way around that. I've asked for an explanation here Len A||C is only required at the end ...


1

There is nothing in the GCM cipher that prevents it's use it in streaming mode. You should however not use the resulting plaintext during decryption for anything that requires security before you have verified the authentication tag. The authentication tag is not to prevent you from decrypting the ciphertext. It is there to provide for integrity and ...


1

One of the major advantages of GCM is the authenticated data input that you can pass. Think about headers of a message that you want authenticated but not encrypted. This is a great thing to have in many practical implementations where some data has to stay in clear but manipulating it by an attacker has serious consequences.



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