New answers tagged

4

Under the ideal cipher model, security is not diminished by any choice of value $H = E_K(d)$ for a known value $d$, as long as none of the counter values that get encrypted to generate the encryption stream is equal to $d$. This is what "ideal cipher" means: you have no information on $E_K(x)$ for any $x$ that you have not already tried to encrypt with the ...


7

This is terrible. In GCM, if you use the same nonce, then the authenticator is completely broken (for all messages in the future). You should never assume that the attacker doesn't know the filename either. You MUST use different IVs.


0

You can use CCM or EAX mode. EAX mode is not standardized by NIST, but it uses AES + AES-CMAC as underlying primitive, implementing a secure authentication mode. You could use AES-CMAC (or EAX mode without any ciphertext and just Additional Authenticated Data) to calculate an authentication tag over the authentication tags of the blocks. Advantage of EAX ...


0

To answer your ideas of: "I use hash-then-encrypt" with CBC + SHA-1 "I use MAC-then-encrypt" with CBC + HMAC "I won't use GCM because of unclear usage guidance" First, hash-then-encrypt is a really bad idea. You really should avoid it if possible. Details are explained in this related question on Crypto.SE. Second, MAC-then-encrypt is a concept you also ...


2

I would say thats not safe. GCM works as CTR, so an attacker that knows (part of) the plaintext version of the file name can compute the beginning of the file as plaintext. If you XOR the two encryption, you'll have the XOR of plaintext, and if you know the filename, you'll get the (beginning of the) file. To securely encrypt the filename you'll need a ...



Top 50 recent answers are included