# Tag Info

0

Here's something similar but completely different... A 'one-way' cryptographic hash function which is regressible when combined with the function's parsed trapdoor index. That is to say, the hash function is the file and the trapdoor table file is the key! The trapdoor table generated is approximately 60% larger than the original file but eminently ...

3

You can build a gigantic, enormous tree that has capacity for up to $2^{80}$ one-time signatures (say). Then, each time you want to sign something, you randomly pick a 80-bit value and use that to select which of the $2^{80}$ subtrees to use to sign the message. As long as the number of messages you intend to sign is much less than $2^{40}$ messages, a ...

2

Issues with the question first: Security is not something you can duct tape on to anything you want after the fact. You can never increase information entropy by processing data. It can be kept constant or decreased depending on whether you are doing a lossless or lossy tranformation. HASH("secret"+"public") is not necessarily secure for all crypto-hash ...

2

SpookyHash is clearly designated by its authors to be a non-cryptographic hash. In the cryptographic world there is simply no room for semi-broken at this level. Either there is some kind of margin to reach, say 128 bit security level or there isn't. This means that it should stand up to the current known attacks and that the design conveys enough piece of ...

1

Given a set of (unhashed) Lamport signatures using the same key, an attacker can trivially forge a signature for any message whose $k$-th bit, for each $k$, is equal to the $k$-th bit of at least one of the signed messages. For example, let's say I know the Lamport signatures for the following 16-bit messages using the same key:  m_1 = 0001111101110001 ...

Top 50 recent answers are included