# Tag Info

## New answers tagged identity-based-encryption

2

I assume $s$ and $b$ are the main master secret key components of two IBE servers. If $s=b$, then $SK_{ID,s}=SK_{ID,b}$ provided that the curve parameters and the hash function $H$ are the same. Now, the question is what's the probability of two IBE servers generating the same master secret key components. This depends on the actual scheme and the field it ...

1

Regarding the 3rd part of your question, "Can and should ordinary, run of the mill elections be conducted online ..." - If one thinks of an election as a problem around the issue of preserving the privacy of many inputs (a people or population's votes) while correctly producing the right result (i.e. correctly tabulating the outcome of the election) and ...

3

To quote yyyyyyy from the comments: The $_R$ has nothing to do with the field — it is associated to $\in$! To quote your first link: "For a set $S$, by $a\in_R S$, we mean that $a$ is randomly chosen from $S$." and to quote SEJPM from the comments: If $p\in \mathbb P$ (with $\mathbb P$ being the set of all primes) then the notations ...

3

First of all, let us simplify the equation by replacing things that the attacker can compute with known constants. We come up with: $$a \cdot b^x = y$$ where the attacker knows $a$ (which is $e(g,h)^k$) and $b$ (which is $e(g, h)$, which he can compute, as he knows $g, h$), and the attacker solves for $x, y$. If it is sufficient for an attacker to find a ...

2

I am really not sure about what you are trying to do. If you simply want to prove that $Ans = e(g,h)^k \times e(g,h)^r$ is hidden given only $(g,h,e(g,h)^k)$, then this is trivial and does not require any hypothesis at all (in particular, no discrete logarithm problem is involved). Indeed, this is perfectly equivalent to the problem of finding $e(g,h)^r$ ...

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