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1

I maintain the fastest implementation of pure Python aes It's reviewed in so far as it passes unit tests in __main__. Patches for more thorough testing are welcome. My fork of pythonaes made the decision that it's the crypto kernel to the point that it requires prepadded input


2

The first problem is, that you calculated $v_i$ wrong right at the start. $$v_i = s_i^2 \mod n$$ This means: $$v_1 = 5^2 = 25 \mod 77$$ $$v_2 = 12^2 = 67 \mod 77$$ $$v_3 = 37^2 = 60 \mod 77$$ Then at the end you have: $$(x \cdot \prod_i v_i^{a_i}) = 67 \cdot 25 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 = 58 \mod 77$$


4

In addition to Paul's answer there is even an ORAM module inside a processor architecture, fully implemented: “A secure processor architecture for encrypted computation on untrusted programs” Abstract: This paper considers encrypted computation where the user specifies encrypted inputs to an untrusted program, and the server computes on those encrypted ...


3

There has been a spike in research interest in ORAM in the past few years for a couple different reasons. The most important one (IMO) is the rise of cloud computing, and the concomitant rise in funding for research related to cloud computing security. The question of what memory access patterns leak to an untrusted server was esoteric and theoretical in ...


0

The Problem was as following: The code works vor Polynomimals f(x) mod p, where p is prime (or gcd(p,coeff(f(x))) = 1), but I wanted the inverse modulo 32, which is in fact: 2^5, so I had to calculate the inverse mod 2 and then lift it to 2^5 The solution was in thread: inverse of polynomials



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