Hot answers tagged initialization-vector
AES is a block cipher which actually only "maps" (encrypt) a 128 bit block (plainblock) to a 128 bit block (cipherblock) and vice versa. This "mapping" is key dependent. To encrypt some data you normally apply an encryption mode like CBC, CTR, GCM etc. using e.g. AES as block cipher within this mode. These modes normally require an IV or Nonce. So, not ...
Using Diffie-Hellman key agreement for generating a nonce should be safe as long as both key pairs are ephemeral, i.e. generated for each run of the key agreement protocol. Otherwise a man-in-the-middle can fool one of the parties in generating the same nonce over and over again. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman is however overkill for generating a nonce, as the ...
Yes, it's secure. It is somewhat overkill, however, since you could stop replay attacks by using either: a persistent counter as IV, or a random nonce, and including a timestamp in the message. The AEAD must authenticate the IV (and GCM certainly does), so either would work without requiring any extra round-trips. You can just use the IV in the initial ...
It seems that all this discussion about the IV is just to confuse the reader. Ignore IV. You just have to do a simple length-extension attack on the CBC-MAC. Yes, one message is enough.
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