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Hot answers tagged initialization-vector

3

This algorithm is vulnerable to a Man in the middle. From Wikipedia: In the original description, the Diffie–Hellman exchange by itself does not provide authentication of the communicating parties and is thus vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Mallory may establish two distinct key exchanges, one with Alice and the other with Bob, effectively ...

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If your IV is predictable this is as (in)secure as assuming that you have a zero vector IV. And a zero vector IV allows you to perform a so-called Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attack (ACPA). Why? Assume that you have a encryption mechanism that works in CBC mode. This means, that on the first iteration the $IV$ is XORed with your input message (which is ...

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Yes, it's secure. It is somewhat overkill, however, since you could stop replay attacks by using either: a persistent counter as IV, or a random nonce, and including a timestamp in the message. The AEAD must authenticate the IV (and GCM certainly does), so either would work without requiring any extra round-trips. You can just use the IV in the initial ...

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Using Diffie-Hellman key agreement for generating a nonce should be safe as long as both key pairs are ephemeral, i.e. generated for each run of the key agreement protocol. Otherwise a man-in-the-middle can fool one of the parties in generating the same nonce over and over again. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman is however overkill for generating a nonce, as the ...

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