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No, IKEv2 has nothing analogous to 'main mode' and 'aggressive mode', and they eliminated the initial 'quick mode', When IKEv1 was originally written, they wanted a strong separation between IKE and IPSec; they had a vision where IKE might be used for things other than IPSec (other "Domains of Interpretation"). So, they completely isolated the "negotiate ...

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I believe that you misunderstand what DH is doing. DH-key-exchange was innovated to defence man-in-the-middle attack, because hackers can not pretend the one you want to communicate without correct share key? or hacker don't know the key generator that Alice and Bob pre-agreed? Well, no, defending against active attackers, that is, attackers who can ...

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The basic DH key exchange is unauthenticated. Authentication needs a different mechanism and has nothing to do with the key exchange. Depending on the attacker model, authentication is not possible, and especially it is not save vs man in the middle (e.g. in the Dolev Yao model). The attacker can just initiate a key exchange with both Alice and Bob, and ...

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Add to the list FHMQV (probably covered by MQV and HMQV patents), and SM2 (Chinese standard for authenticated key agreement, patented by Chinese government, IPR terms unclear). I personally would probably use FHMQV (permissions/licensing issues aside). It is highly recommended to avoid trying to design your own. If you cannot use any of the existing ...

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Yes for sure you can do that. Mapping this protocol to an elliptic curve setting is just like mapping DH key exchange to ECDH key exchange. In AugPAKE you work in a prime order $q$ subgroup of $Z_p^*$ and in the EC setting you use a prime order $q$ elliptic curve group. Observe that in the EC setting a multiplication of group elements in AugPAKE is then ...

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