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That at least does not contradict "the definition of PAKE that supports" sets $PW$ which are known, since the adversary can just try an element of $PW\hspace{-0.03 in}$. ‚Äč However, that does not give meaningful assurance against, for example adversaries who have information which uniquely determines the password without letting the adversary find the ...


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The security - assuming you can validate the correctness of $K$ - is 56 bits (not even counting any attacks on DES itself, assuming to test all keys). This is because you can brute force $K_{BT}$ without even looking at $K_{AT}$ in your particular scheme. 2 key triple DES on the other hand would at least offer over 80 bit security. So this scheme is ...


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Ed25519 is well-defined and requires you to use SHA-512 as internal hash function along with the twisted Edwards version of Curve25519, hence there's no need for a KAC when it comes to questions about the parameters. As for the integrity of the public key, there's not yet a standard for Ed25519 based certificates so there would be a custom solution needed ...


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As far as I know, unknow key-share (UKS) attacks are mostly related to key exchange protocols. Presentation An UKS attack on an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol is an attack whereby an entity $A$ ends up believing he shares a key with entity $B$,and although this is in fact the case, $B$ mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an ...


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different key exchange methods ... Are there any others? More key exchange methods: Kirchhoff's-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution (a) (b) quantum key distribution (c) (d) (These rely more on hardware than on algorithms)



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