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3

What you think of is called an extension attack and it turns out that this is the way to go if you would like to break the general CBC-MAC when the message length is not fixed. All that an adversary needs to do is to mount a chosen message attack. Suppose he asks for the tag on the message $m=m_1||m_2||...||m_l$. The resulting CBC MAC would be ...


3

In general (without talking about MD5): Suppose our hashfunction $H$ is a Merkle-Damgard construction using a Davies-Meyer compression function $h=(H_i,m)=E_{m_i}(H_{i-1})\oplus H_{i-1}$. Since the compression function is public, everybody is able to compute the input to the final round of the MD-Hash. In addition, if you know the input to the final round ...


5

We can attack the MAC defined by: MAC(k,m)=MD5(m||k), in a chosen-messages setup, basically because MD5's collision-resistance is broken. The adversary chooses m and m' of the same length $b\ge64$ bytes, differing only in their first $\lfloor b/64\rfloor$ 64-byte blocks, such that there is a collision after hashing these blocks of m and m'. If follows that ...


5

First of all there does exist information theoretically secure message authentication codes suitable for use with a one time pad. An HMAC is not one of those information theoretically secure. As far as I recall the first article presenting such a construction is the 1981 article by Wegman and Carter: New hash functions and their use in authentication and ...


3

If key 2 and key 3 has a nonnegligible chance to be the same, then the attacker has a nonnegligible chance of being able to generate a valid (Message, MAC) pair. Here's how it works, if the message is not a multiple of 16, then XCBC pads the message out to the next multiple of 16; if it already is, the message remains the same. Then, XCBC logically does a ...


2

As Trevis says, it's at least as safe: there's a simple reduction from the salted to the non-salted MAC, assuming the latter is secure in the standard "existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks". Assuming the adversary has full control of the salt, it also won't buy you anything security wise. In a slightly different setting, where the salt ...


2

Safe, yes, but it doesn't really give you anything. The only use for a salt is to mitigate precomputation attacks against a password. Since it is public, it gives you no extra MAC security. By the property of the MAC, no adversary can forge one without knowing the key, and by the security of your KDF (which includes the salt) no one should be able to get ...


1

Public-key cryptography is not sufficiently computationally burdensome to where other approaches must be used for authentication protocols. Note though that what you describe is not actually public-key based. The verification of the MAC requires Dave and Bob to both have a shared key. Also, note that a random component must be included in some manner in all ...


2

Depends on what you mean by Keccak. There is actually a slight issue here that not all 256-bit Keccak variants have 256-bit preimage resistance. SHA3-256 (in the current SHA-3 draft) does have 256-bit preimage, but if you are using Keccak with 256-bit capacity it only has 128-bit preimage resistance. At least some of the earlier documents had 256-bit output ...


3

Yes, this should be secure, as it is largely compatible with KDF1 and KDF2 which basically use a 4 byte big endian encoding of the counter instead of a direct ASCII conversion to a byte. Note that this construct works fine for master keys (short length, high entropy) but may be vulnerable to length extension attacks if larger input is allowed. However, if ...



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