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18

In short: You must authenticate the IV. Which particular attacks apply if you don't depends on the block cipher mode; I will give two common examples. In CTR mode, an attacker who fiddles with the IV can forge authenticated messages, but the content of the corresponding plaintext is beyond his control (since he doesn't know the key). Depending on the ...


4

The Encrypt then MAC is done in general in order to be sure to decrypt into the correct plaintext, without risking of parsing a non-authentic plaintext message. If you don't MAC the IV, then Mallory (attacker that can tamper with messages as a man-in-the-middle) can modify the IV and your MAC will be still validated as good. So you will decrypt into an ...


2

FFX is not malleable. It's a strong tweakable pseudo-random permutation, where the "strong" here indicates that both encryption and decryption look like random permutations from the attacker's perspective. In particular, there's no relationship between the plaintexts of closely related ciphertexts (aside from the trivial observation that different ...


1

Let $H(m)$ be any strong hash function. Since you want to use encryption only, we'll specify that $H(m)$ = $E_{key}(m)$ where $E$ is a 128-bit block cipher. We're trying to create an encryption mode that will cause any change to the ciphertext to propagate over all blocks of the plaintext. Strategy is to do two passes over the message, first forwards, ...


1

Will this method deliver true non-malleability? No. If we set the ciphertext to the value $(B, B)$, then the decrypted plaintext will have the second block as $B$ (assuming that the PCBC mode uses an implicit plaintext/ciphertext IV of 0; if it's two known constants, it's easy to adjust for that). Even if we ignore this, it also fails to make sure ...



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