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13

The MAC value should be calculated over all of the input, not just the first block. The chaining of CBC makes sure that the bits in the last block of ciphertext depends on all the previous blocks.


9

You would not just need a mode of operation for what you're asking. What you need is a secure transport protocol. Probably the best well known one for TCP connections is TLS of course. For UDP connections you could use DTLS. If you have a shared key you could use one of the pre-shared key (PSK) variants. If you want to create your own transport protocol you ...


9

I would pick e) none of the above. None of those modes offers integrity protection, so unless integrity is handled elsewhere, your application is wildly insecure. An attacker could modify bits in transit and do nefarious things. Of the three, CFB and CTR are the worst for the application and should be very easy for an attacker to mount successful attacks, ...


3

No, this mode as listed does not provide integrity of the decrypted plaintext. An active attacker can flip arbitrary bits from the first 64 bits of the decrypted plaintext freely without causing a decryption failure. He can do this by modifying the $iv$; the decrypted $tag_0$ will authenticate (because the $iv$ is not used to compute that), and then the ...


3

In general you want to treat primitives like block ciphers as black boxes. You first analyze and try to break the block cipher. Once it is proven to operate correctly you can use it as primitive for a block cipher mode of operation. The mode of operation can then be proven to be secure assuming that the block cipher primitive operates well. If you don't ...


2

I doubt something like this exists, because it would be more or less equivalent to having some internal block cipher in a non-standard mode of operation. Also, changing keys is to be avoided when designing high-performance primitives, because it's pretty slow in most modern ciphers. You'd need a weird cipher that had really high key agility, but then you'd ...


1

It's also worth considering the point of a MAC in the first place, i.e. - why it should be calculated over all of the input rather than just the first block. Making the tag dependent on only the first block of the tag would allow an attacker to fill in the rest of the message with whatever they wanted, so long as the first block of CT represented a valid ...



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