Tag Info

Hot answers tagged

9

It is not secure, because an attacker can "mix and match" the output blocks from different authentication tags on different input messages, or repeat output blocks for repeated input blocks. For example, if the attacker knows the tag $F_k(m)$ for a one-block message $m$, then it can forge the correct tag $F_k(m) \mid F_k(m)$ for the two-block message $m ...


7

The other answer is correct in general. However, if your messages are all exactly one block long (or all one block after padding), ECB is a secure MAC. A PRP looks like a PRF up to half its bit length, i.e. up to $2^{64}$ blocks for AES. A secure PRF is a secure MAC of the same size. Thus, AES ECB used on 128-bit messages is a secure MAC as long as you use ...


6

The point of the IV is to prevent the same (key,IV) from ever being used for two different messages in practice. This is an absolute requirement for stream ciphers or block cipher modes such as CTR that are effectively stream ciphers, because re-using the same (key,IV) pair lets an eavesdropper trivially obtain the XOR of two plaintext messages, which means ...


5

GCM Personally, I would go for GCM (Galois Counter Mode) since it is efficient – meaning: it handles pretty much everything you’ld expect from it, while other modes sometimes tend to lack a specific feature here and there (see image below for a comparison that shows what I’m hinting at). Also, GCM has a pretty good performance (assuming non-flawed ...


4

Encrypting big amounts of data is no problem for block cipher - if you remember a few important things. You can't encrypt plaintext which is bigger than the block size. You need to do some addition work. Most cipher operation modes first divide the plaintext into blocks of the size of the cipher. Now you can do different things: How about just encrypting ...


4

You basically want a full disk encryption mode for a block cipher; XTS mode seems to be the current standard. In your case each "disk block" is actually a file offset. Note that using a stream cipher or counter mode is NOT secure if the data is ever modified in the file, as it would violate the cardinal sin of using the same key and initialization vector to ...


3

The catch how ever is that if a small part of the file is given along with the location of that bytes from the beginning of the file we should be able to decrypt just that piece. Normal CTR mode encryption allows one to decrypt any block of the file independent of the rest, so no need to invent your own mode. With AES the block size is always 128 bits, ...


3

I would pick EAX as it is by far the simplest to implement and therefore to understand and audit. It is reasonably fast if based on AES. GCM seems quite popular, but I personally see a number of issues with it: it is very difficult to implement in software (which is not surprising, since it was developed with hardware in mind). it is slower than it seems ...


1

If you look in the OCB submission for CAESAR, you will see that the designers state the security is similar to that of GCM. I would note, however, that GCM has been shown to posses weak key classes, see for example: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/144.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/202.pdf http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/hash2011/proceedings/hash2011_03.pdf ...


1

I read about the AEZ encryption scheme as presented at the CAESAR competition. To me it seems like a construction of an arbitrary length block cipher from a smaller one. The construction is only used in the v1.x of AEZ, because it requires appriximately 1.8 AES calls per block of plaintext, while the one used in v2.0 requires only 1 AES per block ...


1

All of them can be used to deal with unreliable, unordered datagrams; as long as you can derive an IV for the UDP packet then a cipher mode of operation should succeed. You need some kind of unique method of identifying the packet of course. Note that (the information used to generate the) IV may be public. Usually you need some way of identifying the ...



Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible