Tag Info

New answers tagged

4

When decrypting in lattice-based cryptosystems, one computes a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ that is guaranteed to be congruent to a "small" integer $e \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $e$ encodes the message (e.g., as the parity of $e$ modulo 2). By using the integer representatives between $-q/2$ and $q/2$, one can recover the small integer $e$ (and thereby recover ...


1

My understanding is that the coefficients of polynomials used in lattice crypto are often sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. A Gaussian is centered at 0, which would explain why the elements are represented as elements from the set $\{\frac{−(q−1)}{2},…,\frac{(q−1)}{2}\}$, as you mentioned.


1

When using any cryptosystem that relies on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (e.g., ElGamal, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, etc.) then you need a group of prime order. Note that $\mathbb Z_p^*$ where $p$ is prime has order $p-1$. However, if $p=rq+1$ where $q$ is also a large prime, then you have a subgroup of $\mathbb Z_p^*$ of order $q$. If you ...


0

"Elliptic curve encryption" is somewhat popular wording; one better be specific like ElGamal encryption with a group of points on elliptic curve. So, start with ElGamal to understand what kind of group is expected. Try ElGamal with multiplicative group modulo a (large) prime. At last, consider objects named points on a curve as an unusual set with highly ...


1

In RSA, $\phi(N)$ is hidden and this is why nobody could calculate private key. For a prime modulus, order of multiplicative group is not a secret. Well, this question looks like encouraging your own thinking of RSA and related arithmetic, so please keep digging in.



Top 50 recent answers are included