# Tag Info

## New answers tagged multiparty-computation

3

In here, it is 1-2 oblivious transfer meaning that for each $i$, the receiver gets $A'_{i1}$ or $A'_{i2}$ but the sender does not know which. The length of the elements $A'_{ij}$ is not important as long as you choose a correct oblivious transfer protocol.

0

Part (a) above makes me believe there is a risk with FHE security being damaged. Is it possible to use another encryption scheme where this risk is mitigated ? I'm not sure what you mean by that. In what way is security damaged? All ciphers risk security being damaged by leakage. For example if the key leaks, security is damaged. I think what they are ...

1

Ok, here we are speaking of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for some language $L\in NP$. We there have a pair $\sf (P,V)$ of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (called the prover and the verifier) where both have input $x\in L$ and $\sf P$ additionally holds a secret witness $w$ for membership of $x$ in $L$ and wants to convince a ...

2

Your protocol is good (assuming an honest-but-curious adversary model). As DrLecter pointed out, each party will need to publish their sum of shares. To recover the answer, each party then simply xors all published values.

2

I think your first question is answered by K.G., so I'll tackle the other two Why not the inputs? The paper talks about a "secret state". Is the secret state different from input/output? Often the inputs of the corrupted parties assumed to be known, but not those of the honest parties. As far as the secret state, a quote from the abstract might help: ...

2

Suppose you have a black box with some buttons and some lights. When you push the buttons, the lights go on and off. You wonder what's inside, but you cannot open the box. The only way to figure out what's inside is by pushing buttons and observing the lights. Now suppose you have two black boxes. You wonder if they are the same on the inside. Again, you ...

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