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Under the assumption that $(K,\text{Msg})\to H_K(\text{Msg})$ is a secure MAC (be it HMAC or any other MAC), and $\text{Nonce}$ does not repeat and is of fixed size, both $H_K(\text{Msg}||\text{Nonce})$ and $H_K(\text{Nonce}||\text{Msg})$ are demonstrably secure, in the sense that an adversary not knowing $K$ can't distinguish either from random, even for ...


3

You looked on version 1.49 where OCB was not fully implemented as it seems. Actually OCB uses only 120 bit nonce, the other 8 bits are encoded as described in the RFC. Have a look at version 1.50. There OCB seems (nearly) fully implemented and an exception is raised, if the given nonce is longer than 15 bytes (source code line #158).


2

I'll give another answer in case you or someone else needs to work with that version of OCB and/or Bouncy Castle. My understanding of this check is that if the nonce is longer than 16 bytes, or the nonce is 16 bytes and the first bit of the first byte of the nonce is not 0 (assuming big endian), then an error is thrown. Do I understand this ...



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