# Tag Info

13

By the modern definition of a cipher, it must be possible to encipher several messages with the same secret key. That's also a practical necessity, due to the difficulty of securely establishing a shared secret key. That issue is solved with the nonce, which is not secret, and can be transferred as part of the ciphertext (typically: at the beginning). ...

8

The Intel post which I think you mean was discussed in this question and as I wrote there, the limitation only applies in the case of trying to combine PRNG outputs into values larger than the seed entropy (two 256-bit values in their case). Also mentioned there: cryptographic mixing does not increase the entropy you have, so if concatenation is insecure, ...

7

My only idea is that B authenticates himself to A, because if A later decrypts it, A will see whether B was able to decrypt it. But why would you need to increment the nonce? Correct, that's the idea. If B didn't need to increment the nonce and just encrypted the same value, the message sent back would be the same that A sent, so an attacker would be able ...

5

Suppose you do CTR mode as: $E(k,nonce+1) \oplus m_1$, $E(k,nonce+2) \oplus m_2$, $E(k,nonce+3) \oplus m_3$, etc. The wikipedia page is talking about a non-random nonce, with a specific example of a packet counter. So suppose $nonce$ is a packet counter and in each packet you encrypt several blocks. You might end up with the following: In packet #$p$: ...

5

What you're describing is pretty similar to the SIV block cipher mode. It also uses a deterministic function of the message to derive the nonce for CTR encryption. Under some pretty widely accepted assumptions about HMAC-SHA256 this is a perfectly fine way of achieving deterministic authenticated encryption. It doesn't meet IND-CPA (as you pointed out) but ...

5

The IV of encryption schemes can be made public without damaging the security of the encryption, so there shouldn't be any issues with prepending it to the encrypted file. The difference between IVs and Nonces was already explained by @SEJPM in the comments. Note that in the case of GCM, you do need to make sure that you do not re-use the IV with the same ...

5

Using a Unix Timestamp as the sole source for the nonce would make me nervous. In addition to forged NTP replies (and legitimate operators deliberately resetting the clock for some reason, and I'm not sure whether leap seconds would pose a risk), you also would need to worry about "what if I send two messages within the same second" On the other hand, you ...

5

Any of the ways you listed would work. If you're collecting alternatives, yet another one (which I have seen in practice) is to include the message counter as the AAD (additional authenticated data), which is another input to GCM. When we consider which one would be the best, we note that GCM has absolutely no requirement that the nonce be "random", or for ...

4

I will assume you mean the nonce that bitcoin miners iterate. Depending on e.g. wallet software other salts or nonces may be involved. That nonce is only used once, because every miner1 will be hashing a different transaction block (hash) – one which sends the reward for solving the proof of work to their address. A miner could reuse a nonce but they would ...

4

You can use methods for hiding the output of the polynomial hash that don't require nonces, such as encrypting with a block-cipher of matching block-size or hashing it with a keyed hash (PRF). Not using a nonce reduces the security bounds (security decreases as the attacker sees more messages using the same key), makes it incompatible with stream ciphers ...

4

To answer your first question, the incrementation is required in order to prevent spoofing of that message. An attacker could send back the same encrypted nonce claiming to be Bob. However, if Bob incriments the nonce and sends it back encrypted, Alice would know for sure that Bob has received the nonce and has incremented it. Now, Alice encrypting the ...

4

Maybe. But your scheme hasn't been vetted by the community for its impact. Better to use XSalsa20 or the related XChaCha20 as recommended by Bernstein himself: http://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf In my opinion it was a fairly major faux pas that DJB originally chose short 64-bit nonces for Salsa20 and ChaCha20, especially given all the nonce-misuse ...

4

Yes, if the client and the server use the same key to encrypt their messages (instead of having separate keys for client-to-server and server-to-client communication), then you need to ensure that they cannot ever use the same nonce. One way to do that would be to, say, let the client use only even nonce values, and let the server use only odd nonce values. ...

4

For my answer I'll distinguish two cases: a) By "streaming" you mean "online" and b) by "streaming" you mean "can encrypt arbitrarily sized messages". See the CAESAR survey paper for the notions I use here. There can be no fully nonce-misuse resistant online authenticated encryption scheme, i.e. a scheme where the only information leaked upon nonce reuse ...

4

The only limitation that you really have to consider is that of nonce collisions. With 128-bit random nonces, you would expect collisions after about $2^{64}$ nonces due to the birthday bound. Even if you stored all 30 fields of all 50 million rows thousands of times (you need a new nonce if a field is rewritten), you would still have a chance smaller than $... 3 Let's look at your requirements: have a large IV — specifically, one large enough that using a CSPRNG to generate a fresh IV each time is secure. Generally, IVs/nonces longer than 96 bits are thought to be okay for random generation. If it is at least 128 bits you can safely use it as long as you can a 128-bit block cipher like AES, because before you ... 3 Yes, this is secure, even though scrypt uses PBKDF2 inside. PBKDF2 has the issue that it the work factor is required$n$times where$n$is the number hash outputs concatenated to create the final PBKDF2 output. That means that if you can check the validity of PBKDF2 using only the initial bits (in your case used for the key if the hash was SHA-256, for ... 2 Like Ilmari Karonen wrote, you can ensure that nonces picked by two senders do not collide by reserving one bit (like the lowest) to differentiate them. If you use random nonces this is not required, since the probability that a random nonce collides depends only on the total number of nonces generated, not who generates them. In fact, reserving a bit would ... 2 If you reuse a nonce, you lose confidentiality for the messages with that nonce. Messages with other nonces retain their confidentiality. However, the attacker can also attack the MAC part (Poly1305) and generate a third and more messages with the same nonce. See: Why is Poly1305 popular given its 'sudden death' properties? So unless you have a way ... 2 Is it safe to use non-random nonce in GCM? Say I use 0x1 for m1, 0x2 for m2, so on. It is perfectly safe to use a non-random nonce in GCM, as long as you never reuse a nonce for two different messages. So, if you use the message count for the nonce, that's fine; if you accidentally forget that you used nonce 0x5 for a message, and use that again, well, ... 2 No, the nonce is not fit to be a HMAC key, because anybody can view the nonce in transit. If - on the other hand - the TLS connection does deliver enough security then you would not need the HMAC. It's fine to use the nonce as one time code, but you don't need the HMAC for that. If an attacker can obtain nonce's send to clients than the attacker can always ... 2 NaCl's public key authenticated encryption uses a stream cipher for symmetric encryption (after key derivation using Curve25519). Like all synchronous stream ciphers, it produces the same keystream when you use the same nonce. That means you are in the same position as when a one-time pad has been reused. (Having a known plaintext would make things even ... 2 Can one extend the ChaCha and Salsa20 nonces by XORing the extra nonce bits with the key? One can, but one probably should not. Security against related-key attacks is not claimed for either (Salsa20 security pdf): The standard solutions to all the standard cryptographic problems—encryption, authentication, etc.—are protocols that do not allow ... 2 AES-SIV when done well can be very fast. If you have AES-NI then it is possible to get under a cycle per byte. It is not the original AES-SIV construction but rather this one based on GCM (I agree that the original AES-SIV is way too slow). I suggest also that you look at the Caesar candidates. In general, there is no "standard" yet here. 1 If I understand correctly: You have a 256-bit master key$K0$Generate a random 128-bit value$N0$and set the last bit to 0 Generate a 256-bit keystream$K1$using$E_{K0}(N0)$||$E_{K0}(N0 \oplus 1)$Generate a random 96-bit value$N1$Using$K1$as the key, and$N1$as the nonce, encrypt your message with AES256-GCM, and authenticate$N0$as associated ... 1 Unrelated to your question premise, but highly related to the security of the overall scheme is that you may be opening yourself up to a side channel attack. Your supposition about the randomness may hold true as long as the hardware is secure, but if someone gains access to the device, they may be able to make your numbers less than random. This may range ... 1 The authentication tag in GCM is generated by XORing a block cipher output with the Galois field hash (and truncating it for shorter lengths). It is thus assumed to look PRF. So it is effectively just a random nonce that should not collide until a birthday bound of$2^{t/2}\$. With a tag length of 96 or more bits, it should be secure. Shorter random IV ...

1

The answer is that it depends very much exactly on what you are considering. However, better bounds can be achieved by using a 96 bit nonce and a 32 bit counter. This is certainly true for GCM as was proved in this paper (Breaking and Repairing GCM Security Proofs). Note that GCM uses CTR inside, so this is relevant.

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I don't understand the difference between the split nonce/counter design and simply using a random value and incrementing. Why is using nonce +/⊕ counter insecure whereas nonce || counter is secure? Here's the context of your Wikipedia quote (my bold): If the IV/nonce is random, then they can be combined together with the counter using any lossless ...

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