# Tag Info

6

There is no difference. In fact, any quasigroup operation will do. Specifically, the only property we really need is that, for every ciphertext symbol $C$ and every plaintext symbol $P$, there exists one (and only one) key symbol $K$ such that encrypting $P$ with $K$ yields $C$. This implies that, as long as the actual key symbols are chosen uniformly at ...

4

You're never going to release this, right? If so, it doesn't matter. Use a pseudorandom stream from /dev/urandom and "pretend" that it's truly random for the sake of learning about the concepts involved.

4

In a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$, both maskings are perfectly secure, provided that $x \neq 0$ for the multiplicative masking. This is easy to see. The finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ defines two groups: the additive group $\mathbb{F}_p^+$ (i.e., $\mathbb{F}_q$ equipped with addition) and the multiplicative group $\mathbb{F}_q^*$ (i.e., \$\mathbb{F}_q \setminus ...

2

I am basing my answer on Cryptopals. The basic idea is that as {c0,c0+3,c0+6,…} have all been xor-ed with the same byte, the number of differing bits between c0 and c3 is the same as between p0 and p3. (this number is called the Hamming distance between two characters. Furthermore, the distance between [c0 c1 c2] and [c3 c4 c5] is the same as between [p0 ...

2

If you want the encryption to be information-theoretically secure, then you need an information-theoretically secure RNG. And therein lies the problem—how do you establish that a given RNG is information-theoretically secure? Science may say that there are some types of events that are physically unpredictable, but that by itself is insufficient to get a ...

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