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1

So first we'll assume the end-game is to perform a dictionary attack on the not-yet-known hash. In that case you also have a dictionary. First, store the dictionary it's md5 hashes in a database, with a sort index on the md5 hashes. Now, for each character of the hash: Select an md5 hash starting with what you know so far plus 1 extra character for each ...


8

There is no timing attack possible on MD5 as practically implemented on most platforms. That's because MD5 uses only 32-bit addition, 32-bit bitwise boolean operators, and constant rotations/shifts, which exhibit no data-dependent timing for any reasonable implementation, even written without consideration for resistance to timing attacks. There is however ...


1

If the passwords are uniformly randomly generated among all possible byte sequences of the chosen length, then there is no point in having a password that's longer than min(hash length, brute force resistance) where brute force resistance is the number of brute force attempts that you want to resist. Picking a 32-byte password gives you a huge safety margin ...


3

The entropy of passwords is not universally distributed. So hashing can be used to concentrate the input of a hash. The concentration of entropy from another source is called extraction by HKDF, which is a key based key derivation function (which should not be used for passwords). This is from the introduction of RFC 5869, which defined HKDF: Thus, the ...


-2

I did not quite understand the question. Specially the part that says under the context. The answer is no. because, The output of a hash is a fixed value, for any given input of any length (If the length of the input is shorter than the block size, depending on the HASH algorithm being used, an appropriate padding scheme is present). So whether the ...


2

No, since passwords are usually far from uniformly distributed.



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