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5

Actually, the problem with OTP isn't the storage of the pad (although secure erasure of the parts of the pad you used is trickier than it looks), and it isn't the pad generation (although, again, that's trickier than it looks), but the secure transport. After all, it's not enough for you (Alice) to have the secure pad, you also have to give a copy to the ...


5

This expands CodesInChaos's comment into an answer. Forward Secrecy (that is, maintaining confidentiality of messages enciphered before compromise of the long term key) can be achieved in a protocol using a public-key signature scheme with a long-term public key, and a public-key encryption scheme with a per-session key; but in the case of RSA signature and ...


4

No, DHE is secure and allows to share a common secret between two parties over an insecure channel. But you cannot know, if the one you share the secret with is the one you want (DHE is vulnerable to man in the middle attacks). So DHE-RSA uses DHE to share a common secret and signs the communication with RSA to make sure, that both persons communicate with ...


3

To use the proper terminology: in TLS, cipher suites which include "some Diffie-Hellman" are: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman: DH_anon Static Diffie-Hellman: DH-RSA, DH-DSS... Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman: DHE-RSA, DHE-DSS... There is no "plain DHE" cipher suite in TLS; it is called "DH_anon". As the name indicates, with DH_anon, the server is "anonymous": you ...


3

One possibility for what you might be missing: normally the same key (the same matrix) is re-used to encrypt many messages. So now try counting the total entropy in $M$ length-$N$ messages, and the entropy in a $N\times N$ matrix, and compare what happens when $M$ gets large.... Another possibility you might be missing is the consequences of the fact that ...


2

Well, for perfect secrecy, we require that for all message distributions over $\mathcal{M}$, all messages $m\in\mathcal{M}$, and all (possible) ciphertexts $c$ it holds that $$Pr[M=m\ |\ C = c] = Pr[M=m]$$ In particular, that means, if we can find a single counterexample, i.e. a distribution over $\mathcal{M}$, a message $m\in\mathcal{M}$, and a ...


2

Since this is homework, let me just give you a hint: consider the two-character messages $m_1 = \text{"aa"}$ and $m_2 = \text{"ab"}$. Given a ciphertext $c$ encrypted with a monoalphabetic substitution cipher, can you tell which of $m_1$ or $m_2$ it corresponds to, even without knowing the key? Why (not)? What does this imply about perfect secrecy?


1

You're missing that key generation would occur inside the box (if there was one for RSA key agreement), like for $k_{pr,A}$ and $k_{pub,A}$ on page 343, rather than outside the box, as happened for $k_{pub,CA}$ on page 347.



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