# Tag Info

2

I guess you are taking this information from this document. In Section 2.1 you can see a table with different sizes. In particular, a plaintext block (that is, an encoded message) has size $(n-k) \log_2 p$ bits, while a ciphertext has size $n \log_2 q$ bits. The explanation is simple: ciphertexts are actually polynomials of $n$ terms (since degree is $n-1$)...

0

As NEWHOPE builds its security proof based upon previous works, and that Google has been experimenting with it, I think I should read the paper more thoroughly and hop along.

3

Yes, these are public parameters of the system. Note that NTRU is not implemented exactly this way any more. The most up-to-date current spec is EESS#1, which can be obtained from https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto/blob/master/doc/EESS1-v3.1.pdf.

1

Blockchains seem to be a common buzzword these days. And more often than not it is used by people, who don't understand the actual concept in detail. For example, that blockchains are based on assumptions about the distribution of processing power. And when you use it outside the context of bitcoins, you still need an incentive for many people to contribute, ...

0

First, the name keyless signature infrastructure is inherently misleading as this actually has nothing to do with real digital signatures, it is rather some kind of time-stamping service. Now, to answer your actual question: These KSI constructions are solely based on the security of cryptographic hash functions. They do not make use of any other hardness ...

2

I do not have enough high reputation to comment so I am writing here. I have also looked at the paper so I would like to share my thoughts. I think that in order to understand whether the bit is in the "plain sight" one has to ask the question: Is it possible to recover the bit $y$ from the cipher g=y\oplus \bigoplus _{i=1}^{\alpha}\bigoplus_{a=1}^{\beta}{...

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I would just like to know on what basis they can say it is PQC without any NP problem reduction. I believe that the point you're making is assuming that a Quantum Computer could solve any problem in NP that's not actually NP-complete quickly (or, at least, in polynomial time). That's not known to be true; Quantum Computers would be able to solve some ...

9

There are known impossibility results regarding basis public-key cryptography on NP-complete problems. In this paper by Goldreich and Goldwasser they show that under common types of reductions, it is not possible to base public-key cryptography on NP-hardness.

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