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Actually, if the RSA key generation is malicious, there are even more subtle ways that can someone can leak the key. The cleverest way I've seen works like this (assuming that we're generating an RSA-1024 key; for RSA-2048, we just use a larger curve): The attacker generates an EC public/private key pair; using a 192 bit curve for RSA-1024 is good. He ...

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The field of cryptography that you are looking for is called Kleptography. In kleptography, we are dealing with a setting where the device performing your cryptographic tasks is potentially malicious. Now this device tries to leak information to some attacker that allows this attacker to break the used cryptographic scheme. If I am not mistaken that scheme ...

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You can do something like what you are suggesting. But, the EC_Dual_DBRG also has biases in the stream and so you cannot use it without changes (e.g., truncating much more). However, this is based on the same operations as ElGamal. The public key is set up exactly as proposed. Then, to encrypt a message $m$ of any length, do: Choose a random ...

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Does the length of the public key imply the length of the private key, or can they be unrelated? Yes. The sizes of public and private keys depend on the cryptosystem. Usually they are related somehow, but not necessarily. For example, you can store a short value as a private key, which is then used as a PRNG seed to generate the private key used in the ...

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What you are looking for is a definition of PEM, privacy enhanced mail. Obviously PEM is not just used for mail anymore. The definition of the header lines seems to be best described by section 4.6: "Summary of Encapsulated Header Fields" of RFC 1421: "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication ...

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I'm answering this based on the TLS v1.2 certificate based client authentication feature. Other protocols may vary in the details. Can anybody tell me what is being sent from the user's side for getting authentication from the server? The overhead to a normal handshake consists only of the user's certificate (+ intermediate certificates eventually, ...

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This is a rather open ended question, but I'll try to answer: Limitations: most ECDSA implementations require a secure random generator - if the same random value is reused (for different plaintext) then the private key parameter can simply be calculated; ECDSA requires a hash function and cannot be (easily?) used for signatures with message recovery ...

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That doesn't hide Bob's identity from eavesdroppers. (The OP mentioned in chat that the OP isn't trying to do that.) I can no longer spot any other problems with the key exchange part. The encryption/decryption of application level data is vulnerable to arbitrary replays and reflection and dropping. ​ The public MAC input should indicate direction and ...

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Theorem: Let $gcd(a,n)=1$ and $\phi(n)$ be Euler's totient function, then $a^{\phi(n)} \pmod n=1$. One of this famous methods for encrypting is RSA. In this method we use above theorem. Let $e,n$ are public and $\phi(n) , d$ are private such that $e\cdot d =1\pmod {\phi(n)}$$(e\cdot d=1-t\cdot \phi(n))$. For encryption we have: ...

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what is the range for exponent e? Actually, there is no required upper bound for $e$ (except that some implementations may reject ridiculously large values). The math behind RSA states that any $e$ that is relatively prime to both $p-1$ and $q-1$ will work, no matter how large it is. There might not appear to be a need for an $e > lcm(p-1, q-1)$ (as ...

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RSA modules factoring are not hard in general case. In special cases we can factor numbers easily. One of these special cases is weak prime number, if at least one of two RSA modules primes is weak we can factor it easily. It is interesting that number of such $1024$ bit modules are at least $2^{750}$ and for $2048$ bit is $2^{1500}$. Your mentioned RSA ...

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Is javascript RSA signing safe? …is safe or can people forge… In contrast to the accepted answer, I would not call it “safe” from a cryptographic point of view and I would definitely not say that “ if you take good care of securing your environment where you run the JS code you will be OK. ” because the sad fact is: that’s not enough to ensure ...

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I will assume for simplicity that you're talking about the full multiplicative group of $F_p$ instead of a proper subgroup, thus there are no problems with $g^a+1$ (except when $g^a=p-1$ which can be trivially ruled out by comparing to $p$). The quantity $\log_g(g^a+1)$ is sometimes referred to as the Zech logarithm (strictly speaking, it is defined for ...

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What you seem to be looking for is a scheme like the following: It consists of two algorithms, a key generation algorithm $K$ and a "key use" algorithm $U$. The key generation algorithm outputs a pair of keys $(k_0, k_1)$. The "key use" algorithm takes as input a key and an element from some set $S$ (which may depend on $k_0$ and $k_1$), and outputs an ...

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With such a small block size there is no way to employ RSA padding modes such as PKCS#1 v1.5 padding or OAEP. You could however see the encryption as ECB mode encryption. In that case you could apply padding mechanisms that have been constructed for symmetric block ciphers. Those padding modes however have been defined for bytes rather than characters. ...

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This is - in a way - Functional Encryption. From Wikipedia: Functional encryption is a type of public-key encryption in which possessing a secret key allows one to learn a function of what the ciphertext is encrypting. So, YES, it is possible. For more information this paper might prove useful.

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There is 3 kind of discrete log problem as you explained : Diffie-Hellman problem (Dlog): Pick $a \in \{1,\ldots,q\}$. Compute $A = g^a (mod\ p)$ Given $(p,q,g,A)$ find $a$. Assumed hard. Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) : Pick $a,b \in \{1,\ldots,q\}$. Compute $A = g^a (mod\ p)$ and $B = g^b (mod\ p)$ Given $(p,q,g,A,B)$ find $g^{ab}$. Note ...

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Preliminary on notation: in the question, it seems advisable to change $C=T_{k}M$  to $C=T_{k}(M)$ , and change $M=T^{-1}_{k}C$  to $M={T_k}^{-1}(C)$ it is necessary to change $T_{k}T^{-1}_{k}=I$  to ${T_k}^{-1}\circ T_k=I$ , meaning that the function obtained by applying $T_k$ then its inverse ${T_k}^{-1}$ is identity, with $\forall M, ... 1 I think it covers both symmetric and asymmetric systems. Given a transformation$T_k$, if computing$T^{-1}_k$is easy then this is a symmetric cryptosystem. On the other hand, if this is difficult than it is an asymmetric one. Note that in this case, we are ''hard-coding'' the key$k$inside the transformation. Thus we are just given the transformation ... 1 Your definition only covers symmetric encryption since the same "index"$k$is used in$T_k$and$T^{-1}_k$(i.e., encryption and decryption use the same key) If you want to give a generic definition that covers both types of encryption, you could say that the transformations are$T_k$and$T^{-1}_{k'}$and that in the case of symmetric encryption$k'=k$. 1 Perhaps a simplified example or two might help you intuitively understand the concept. Let's say you want to let your little brother and sister encrypt messages so that either of them can encrypt any message, but only you can decrypt them. To keep things simple, let's say that the messages are simply numbers from$1$to$10$. Your siblings have been ... 1 You'll have to write the function you are trying to calculate as a polynomial in the two inputs$x$and$y$. If you are working over the field with$q$elements as plaintexts, you have to calculate for equality the polynomial$(x-y)^{q-1}\$. Greater-than-or-equal (however you define that for finite fields) will be even more complicated.

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