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TL;DR: If an attacker can gain less than 50k-100k USD from breaking all the "passwords" you're fine, else you could be screwed. (for 10k iterations, using SHA-1 for PBKDF-2) How secure would be to use PBKDF2 without salt (or with the same salt for all) with a 16 digits passwords that are unique (there can't be two identical)? It would keep medium-...


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No, wrapping the data key set seems a good idea to me. It's pretty standard and should even work with e.g. hardware modules. Note that your old ciphertext would still rely on the security of your old secret (password) when you choose this scheme! If $Enckey$ is ever guessed it can be confirmed by decrypting (the first part of) your ciphertext. There is a ...



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