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Yes. Any good standard digital signature algorithm will be secure in this setting. Digital signature algorithms are designed to be secure against chosen-message attacks, where the attacker can choose any set of messages and learn the signatures on those messages; the security of the signature scheme means that this doesn't help the attacker at all. This ...


2

First and foremost: it is a bad idea to invent a method to sign or encrypt with RSA (or any crypto). Standards like PKCS#1 or ISO/IEC 9796-2 are here for that purpose, and even these occasionally have more or less subtle flaws. Given comments, I'll assume that the question is about an RSA encryption scheme enciphering message $M$ into $(M||S)^e\bmod N$, and ...


1

The primary problem with encrypt-then-sign (signing the ciphertext) relates to the difference between signing for the purpose of assigning responsibility vs for the purpose of taking credit. Encrypt-then-sign is OK for the former but not for the latter. The issue is quite subtle. In particular, in your protocol, the recipient has no reason to believe the ...


-1

Take a printer, and have the log file come out of the machine on paper. Ensure fire doesn't exist near the paper. Anything else will not work: if an attacker can wind back time log files can die and you cannot tell. All techniques for assuring time cannot be run backwards amount to doing this in some form, perhaps by sending data to another computer. But if ...



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