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4

Assuming you really had broken AES or another frequently used algorithm that is thought to be secure, the first step would be to prove it. Write the code for the attack. Verify that it works on randomly generated data of the kind it requires. If it can break some challenge (e.g. these), do it. Post the results to the challenger or show the results ...


2

Assuming for the moment that your claim is correct, I would suggest caution in revealing the details of your findings. After having your results validated by one or two people with the skills to do so (and whom you trust to keep things confidential), then some sort of general announcement (without specifics) would be best, to give people time (say three ...


10

In complete honesty: if you have to ask this question, it's overwhelmingly unlikely that you have actually succeeded in breaking the security of AES. At best, you may have discovered a well-known attack against misuse of particular block cipher modes; for instance, plaintext recovery with a chosen-ciphertext attack against ECB, or blind manipulation of the ...


-1

Make sure you put your name prominently in the source, and publish the source anywhere. If you're right, everyone else will make you famous. If wrong, someone will point out your error. Send it to Bruce Schneier if you want to start at the top.


1

GPG is an implementation of OpenPGP, which is a higher level protocol than e.g. mcrypt. So use GPG for PGP compatibility and mcrypt or related libraries for more direct - lower level - access to algorithms. AES is Rijndael for a block size of 128 bits and the 128, 192 or 256 bit key sizes. So you are OK there. Learn about modes of operation and something ...


0

OK, here's the node.js module that I wrote based on the swap-or-not algorithm in the papers of the first comment (by Ricky Demer). It requires the Long module. It supports inputs up to 63 bits (there are plenty of algorithms for 64 bits and above). Inputs and outputs should be Long objects. The $K_i$'s are chosen using an aes-256-ctr pseudo-random stream. ...


0

You are over-thinking about cryptography. It's not supposed to be that complex. I started with the idea "let make 1 chip have multiple id". And I come up with something relatively simple than what you mentioned so far. (I'm not sure if this usable in your situation or not. It's just based on the info you described.) Prepare: I will make every chip have ...


3

A key derivation function lets you derive keys from others. In this case I would use HKDF, which means using HMAC in a predefined way. Your key material is the keys $X$ and $Y$, so you can concatenate those to get the PRK for HKDF-Expand. An output key would then be $\operatorname{HMAC}(X||Y, \text{info} || \text{0x01})$, if the size of the HMAC is long ...


1

HMAC is considered the most secure way of combining two keys, as compared to a single round of SHA256. hmac is designed to fold in the key material in 2 hash operations, which helps resist chosen plaintext attacks on sha-256, although SHA256 has no known chosen plaintext attacks at this time. Symmetric ciphers are considered less reliable than hashes for ...


0

HMAC: The hmac version is considered slightly more secure than sha-256, assuming it's also based on SHA-256, because the HMAC formulation folds in the key material with 2 rounds of hashing, making it harder to use a chosen plaintext attack on the digest. SHA-256: SHA-256 should be relatively secure against chosen plaintext attacks, but it's better to be ...


4

You can get what you want programmatically. No special ciphers or modes needed. You say there is a single, continuous subset that needs to be encrypted. Thus, you could have a function where the programmer specifies the start of the portion of the plaintext that needs to be encrypted and the number of bytes to encrypt. The function could pull that part out, ...



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