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Yes. There has been a lot of work on "proof of work" protocols or "time-lock puzzles." Typically in cryptography, functions are either easy to compute or intractable. These protocols look at functions that are moderately hard to compute. To do time-release encryption, you need a puzzle with the following properties: Difficulty of the puzzle can be ...

With neither a trusted third party nor trusted hardware, we know no system with an even mildly accurate delay of release. If we accept a trusted third party, there are options. For example: The trusted third party generates a public/private key pair per hour (for an asymmetric cipher such as RSA-OAEP), publish the public $Pub_t$ keys in advance (signed with ...

Yes. The following paper looks at the question you asked about: Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and David Wagner. Time-lock puzzles and timed-release Crypto. March 1996. That paper describes how to encrypt a message $M$, so that decrypting $M$ requires a controlled amount of computation (say, $T$ CPU cycles). Here is the gist of the main scheme. To ...

There is such a kind of primitive in the article about timed commitments from Boneh and Naor. This is a kind of encryption scheme where decryption can be forced, but at a heavy non parallelizable cost, and such that it can be proven in advance, at low cost, that forced decryption will work. It relies on repeated squarings modulo a RSA modulus.

Because there's no inherent sense of time for a computer, there's not really any way to accomplish this. The best you could do would be to require a lot of computation and try to make it have to be as serial as possible. But even if there's a good way to do that, faster computers could do it more quickly. If you want something to stay encrypted for a ...

Going with the theme of out-of-the-box solutions started by e501, I do recall at least a half-serious suggestion that, with a retransmitter (or just a big mirror) placed in outer space at a suitable distance from Earth, one could use light-speed lag as an effective time capsule mechanism — just encode the message as a laser pulse and send it out for a ...

InfoBiology by printed arrays of microorganism colonies for timed and on-demand release of messages is a recently development method that leverages biological systems to create messages that impose a limit on the amount of time it takes to learn a message. The idea is simply to encode a message in a pattern of e. coli colonies. The message is released after ...

A pure algorithmic approach does exist, however it only provides a fuzzy bound. It is related to the proof of work / client puzzles I described in this answer. The signer will sign the message using a normal digital signature, and use the message and signature to instantiate a "cryptographic puzzle." A cryptographic puzzle is a moderately hard function ...

The theory is explained in the research paper that introduced the idea: Time-lock puzzles and timed-release crypto. Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and David A. Wagner. MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Technical memo MIT/LCS/TR-684 (1996) (Revision 3/10/96). The paper is cited in Rivest's description of the time capsule. As the security analysis in ...

Since there's no way to control your execution environment, there's no way to ensure your algorithm is executed as described, with the actual current time. Thus, the only way to ensure something like this is to make it computationally difficult to decrypt, which is a limit on the amount of computational effort spent, not on the amount of real time spent. The ...

This is all about the question of risk assessment. Are you willing to risk all devices together so that if one key is compromised, they all have to be returned? What is the cost of one return, 100 returns, or 100,000 returns? What is the expense of issuing a master key? Of issuing ten master keys? Of issuing a thousand? Do you have an estimate for how ...

Rabin and Thorpe wrote a technical report on this topic here: ftp://ftp.deas.harvard.edu/techreports/tr-22-06.pdf "Time-Lapse Cryptography" There are a number of relevant citations there as well. There's also a poster of a prototype they built: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~cat/papers/tlc-poster.pdf.

Unless $2^t$ is the order of $2$ in the group $\mathbb Z_n$, in which case the solution is trivial. Unless the factors of $n$ are known, in which case the Chinese remainder theorem can be used. Unless $n$ (or its factors) has a special form, with only a few sparse bits being set (e.g. $n = 2^a + 2^b + 1$) and similar cases where $n$ has only a few ...

Cryptographic algorithms are not time-aware, so you require a time-aware third-party to accomplish this. The third-party also needs access to a secure time source (like an on-site atomic clock or a secure connection to an offshore one) The precise implementation and protocol depends on your usecase, but as an example you could have a server that does two ...

There is no general way to compute the "cryptoperiod". Usually, the algorithm should specify how often you need to change keys, to achieve a desired level of security against cryptanalysis attacks. For instance, AES in CBC mode has some weaknesses once you encrypt anywhere close to $2^{64}$ blocks with the same key, so you should change the key long before ...

I don't believe there is any way to achieve what you want, within your constraints. You stated as a requirement that a user must be able to get all of their data from the server, without storing anything other than their private key. If an attacker learns the private key, the attacker then knows everything that the user does, so of course the attacker can ...

I am not aware of any exact solutions to what you are looking for. That said, one design came to mind. Like others have suggested would be necessary, this protocol requires a trusted third party. The idea is to use multi-party computation. There will be three parties, a sender, a receiver, and a trusted third party. The sender encrypts a message and sends ...

The basic principle of encryption (Kerchoff's principle) is that the only thing necessary to decrypt data is the key. So really your question is, is "How can I make the full key available only during a certain time?" The two obvious answers are to either a) Only reveal the key during that time, or b) make the key depend on data only knowable during that ...