# Tag Info

7

By Theorem 3 on page 15 of this paper, no secure-with-abort protocol for equality of long strings can be within 1/5 of fair. If there is a protocol for equality on a domain of size at least 3 which is secure against honest-but-curious adversaries, then oblivious transfer protocols exist. If oblivious transfer protocols exist, then there are protocols for ...

6

This does seem to be zero knowledge; as you say, you don't actually commit to the adjacency list. Rather, you commit to a series of edges, in random order. Regarding the question: First, your assumption is that $n^2$ commitments, each to a single bit, is more expensive than $|E|$ commitments, each to $2\log n$ bits (to encode two numbers for the edge). This ...

6

SRP does DH key exchange with authentication, and has the capability to also authenticate the server as well (though usually the server is authenticated by keeping the verifier secret). If the key is generated strictly from a password and salt, with the salt stored on the server, you can do a dictionary attack on the verifier (e.g. if the server is ...

6

Sigma protocols as-is are secure only for honest verifiers. However, they can be easily compiled into full-blown zero knowledge protocols. If you don't want interaction, then the Fiat-Shamir transform suffices, with security in the random oracle model. With interaction, you can do the transform at little cost using commitments based on DDH. For more ...

5

If one-way functions exist, then there is a distribution over graphs (or SAT formulas, or ...) having the property you're asking for. In short, just put the OWF through the Cook-Levin reduction. In a little more detail, Cook-Levin transforms the NP witness-finding question "what is a preimage of $y = f(x)$?" (for random unknown $x$) into the NP ...

5

What does this mean, exactly? The purpose of the environment is to model "everything else happening in the universe" besides the protocol execution. In the UC model, the adversary is allowed to talk to the environment during the execution of the protocol. So UC security means "security no matter what else is going on in the world, even if other things ...

5

There are many ways of doing this. A very nice read (but with informal presentation) is this paper by Fagin, Naor and Winkler on Comparing Information without Leaking It. A very fast protocol exists which requires a single oblivious transfer for every bit. Let $n$ be a security parameter; say $n=128$, and let $\ell$ be the bit-length of the inputs. For ...

4

I guess you are talking about Figure 5.3? It is said that the Schnorr proof (sigma protocol for discrete log relation) is insecure against cheating verifiers - it is only honest-verifier zero knowledge. Sigma protocols are always only defined in the honest-verifier zero-knowledge setting. To see why a cheating verifier is a problem in Figure 5.3 think ...

4

One could split both secrets into smaller parts, commit to parts and "gradually" open that commitments to each other, so that no party is better than (ahead of the other) one such part. For example, let secret be a big number split into bits. With an additively homomorphic bit commitment scheme, the other party could verify that bit commitments correspond ...

4

Rough scetch, assuming Bob is standing next to you in the same room: Prepare cards with the correct numbers on them Lay down the cards according to the setup, face up Lay down the remaining cards with the correct solution, face down, so that Bob can't see them. Now you let Bob choose one column, row or sector. You pick up the cards in that row, column ...

4

Even following your edits, there's still some confusion about honest verifier zero knowledge and plain-old (i.e., "possibly malicious verifier") zero knowledge, which is a much stronger property. Your description of HVZK is essentially correct, but with the following clarifications: A 3-move protocol between a prover P and a verifier V for a language ...

4

There is quite a bit of confusion in your question. First, differentiate between the real and ideal models. The adversary in the ideal model sends the adversary's input and gets its output (and can also sometimes determine if the honest party gets output, depending on the model). We often call the ideal adversary a "simulator" since this is how we build the ...

4

This cannot be done. It is provably impossible. In order to explain this in technical terms, what you are looking for is a FAIR protocol to compute equality of long random strings (I added the latter since it adds a constraint and so in theory could make it easier). In any case, if I had such a protocol, then I could toss a fair unbiased coin. Here is the ...

4

I have written a tutorial on how to write simulation-based proofs. I think that it should be helpful.

3

Answering the question in your title (and not addressing your proposed alternative which I don't quite understand) there is a zero knowledge proof of password protocol "SRP" which is fast and effective. SRP does not seem to have been given as wide publicity as it should get. Having implemented it, and being an advocate of its use, I don't really understand ...

3

There are two answers. One, go non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir transform. This requires the Random Oracle Model (ROM) to analyse, but the ROM is standard enough in cryptography and ROM proofs have been used in practice for long enough that this shouldn't worry you. It gets you full ZK, curiously enough for the exact same reason that plain Schnorr is ...

3

Having a client (ex. your web browser) use zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate itself to a server only makes sense if the server knows about the client's public key in advance, and if the client keeps the same private key forever. So you could have the client-side generate a keypair when you register your account, and the server records your public key ...

3

If you use a one-time pad as your encryption function then this simplifies to a proof that Alice knows some $F$ that hashes to $H$. $K$ can be trivially derived from $F$ and $E(K, F)$ by xor-ing. An interactive zero-knowledge proof of this simpler problem - Alice proving she knows a pre-image of $H(F)$ - would go something like this: You need to use a ...

2

The common reference string in NIZK does not have to be uniformly distributed. It is to be sampled from whatever distribution the NIZK protocol specifies. However, the common random string in NIZK does have to be uniformly distributed, and the setup strings in NIZK also have to be uniformly distributed.

2

I believe a zero knowledge proof that $-1$ is a quadratric nonresidue would accomplish that. If we know that $n$ has two prime factors, and that $n \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$, then $n$ is either a product of two primes both $1 \bmod 4$, or two primes both $3 \bmod 4$. If it were the former, then $-1$ is a QR modulo $p$, and $-1$ is a QR modulo $q$, and hence $-1$ ...

2

This has some issues, with both soundness and zero-knowledge. The issue with zero-knowledge is that an eavesdropper who knows $L$ and overhears legitimate traffic can compromise the secret quite easily. While factoring is hard, taking a GCD is very efficient. That means that given $M=pr$ and $L=pq$, an eavesdropper Eve can efficiently compute $\gcd(M,L)=p$. ...

2

The objective of the simulator is to make the simulated world (often called the ideal world) indistinguishable from the real world (running the actual protocol). See my write-up on the UC framework here for more detail. In the proof setup, the entity attempting to distinguish between the two worlds is often assumed to provide the inputs to the parties. That ...

2

The simplest example I know of is actually for a pathological case. Namely, it is presented in Chapter 2 of the book of Hazay and Lindell as an example of a two-party MPC protocol which is secure against a malicious adversary but not against a semi-honest one (in the classical sense, for this reason they prefer the notion of augmented semi-honest ...

2

The probabilistic nature is not specific to special-honest verifier zero-knowledge but that's what zero-knowledge is about. With zero-knowledge you want to formulate that such an interactive proof does not leak any information besides the validity of the claim, as it is efficiently simulatable meaning that real and simulated transcripts are not ...

2

The simulator obtains "client $B$'s input" in the same way the simulator obtains $\:\{\hspace{-0.03 in}0,\hspace{-0.04 in}0\hspace{-0.03 in}\}\;$. Even in the real world, the server computes its response without using any secrets, that response is the only message $B$ receives, and (from your description) no other party gives any output. $\:$ Thus, it ...

2

Yes, it's okay. This is actually mentioned in passing in the SRP 6 design paper. Previous versions used a random $u$ where an attacker who saw (or could predict) it before revealing $A$ could compute $A = g^a v^{-u}$ and use this to effectively cancel out the long term secret. With $u$ derived from a hash, even if the attacker saw $B$, the dependence of $u$ ...

2

Consider a multiplicative group of an order $q$ generated by some $g$. For simplicity, let commitment be $C_1 = g^{L_1}$. Consider a proof of knowledge of $L_1$ committed to at $C_1$. At the first step of an interactive proof, choose some $L_2$ at random and send $C_2 = g^{L_2}$ to the verifying party. Second step, receive a challenge $c$. Third step, send a ...

2

Do you allow Bob to ask all the users having $F$ to encrypt, then to upload the file with a same secret key deriving from $F$ ? Here would be the principle of the tweaked protocol : all the users must encrypt the file with the same key which depends on the file (calculated via another hash). The key would be a kind of shared key, but which can only decrypt ...

1

I've found some lecture notes where, in section 2.4, they give the steps that a simulator would do in order to simulate the view of the honest prover talking to the honest verifier (HVZK). In response to the first question, in the case when the simulator initially guessed wrong the challenge coming from the verifier, the verifier is rewinded but the ...

1

Yes. $\:$ The verifier(s) need(s) to know a statistically binding commitment to $\Psi \hspace{-0.02 in}$.

Only top voted, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible