meta user
network profile
| bio | website | plzz.de |
|---|---|---|
| location | Germany | |
| age | 25 | |
| visits | member for | 1 year, 6 months |
| seen | Mar 21 at 18:47 | |
| stats | profile views | 6 |
I'm a Software Developer based in Berlin, Germany.
I'm on Google+
- Moderator ♦ at
Ask Ubuntu
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Nov 9 |
comment |
Where can i get the info to implement AES? My python implementation of AES is supposed to be very easy to read, and it's got a good few comments. For what it's worth, it might help you or someone else implementing aes: code.google.com/p/zs-crypto/source/browse/zs/cipher/aes.py. A tip: read this code together with the wikipedia articles on AES. Most of the maths turns out to be really straightforward. |
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Nov 9 |
comment |
Is there a hash function with 2048bit output? While this isn't a hash function at all, PBKDF2 should do what you need. It also gives you the ability to control how much time to spend on generating keys, thereby making it harder to brute force the key. |
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Nov 9 |
revised |
Is it reasonable to assure that p-1 and q-1 aren't smooth? deleted 1 characters in body |
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Nov 9 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Nov 9 |
revised |
Encrypting and obscuring data between site/user without SSL added 357 characters in body |
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Nov 9 |
revised |
Encrypting and obscuring data between site/user without SSL added 208 characters in body |
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Nov 9 |
awarded | Editor |
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Nov 9 |
revised |
Encrypting and obscuring data between site/user without SSL added 66 characters in body |
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Nov 9 |
answered | Encrypting and obscuring data between site/user without SSL |
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Nov 9 |
comment |
How much would it cost in U.S. dollars to brute force a 256 bit key in a year? @Joren Good question! :) Some attacks compromise a certain number of rounds of AES with some complexity. For instance, a 2009 attack by Biryukov et. al. compromises 9 rounds of AES with a complexity of 2^39 (as opposed to 2^256 for brute force). It stands to reason that using a 256 bit key rather than a 128 bit key is the easiest way to increase the number of rounds from 10 to 14, i.e. without changing the AES spec. On a side note, Bruce Schneier has previously commented that if ever AES is broken too badly, we merely need to increase the number of rounds to fix it. |
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Nov 9 |
awarded | Autobiographer |
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Nov 9 |
asked | Is it reasonable to assure that p-1 and q-1 aren't smooth? |
