685 reputation
219
bio website en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…
location United Kingdom
age 26
visits member for 2 years, 4 months
seen Mar 27 at 12:08

Pentester, ex-developer, security researcher, reverse engineer, electronics tinkerer, internet activist, zombie eradicator, promulgator of useless facts, shrubbery inspector, bacon aficionado.

Strengths: Security, Crypto, Win32 API, C#, .NET, PHP, x86 assembly

All answers and comments are encrypted with ROT256-ECB.

Opinions are my own. Advice provided with no warranty.


Jul
22
comment Is this a secure implementation of password reset email?
Treat all password-reset tokens and auto-login tokens as passwords. They essentially are passwords. They need to be long and generated by a strong random number generator. When storing them in the database, hash them with a strong adaptive KDF such as bcrypt.
Jul
20
comment Relation between Threshold Cryptosystem and Secure Multiparty Computation ?
There's no formal study of the relation, because that's like asking for a study on the relationship between basketball and sports. Threshold cryptosystems are a type of secure multiparty computation.
Jul
20
comment How to hack the new save encryption on ipad for uplink?
Hehe, this brings back memories. I used to be pretty active on the forums back in the early days of Uplink!
Jul
20
answered Relation between Threshold Cryptosystem and Secure Multiparty Computation ?
Jul
20
comment Is truncating a hashed private key with SHA-1 safe to use as the symmetric key for AES for data at rest?
Why bother? Just generate a completely independent random key and encrypt it with the private key.
Jul
17
awarded  Citizen Patrol
Jul
16
comment Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
@poncho The only thing the two parties have pre-shared is their locations, e.g. an IP address.
Jul
16
comment Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
I have to agree with @CodeInChaos here. I don't even have software installed to read PPT files.
Jul
16
comment S-box design criteria and random sboxes
D'oh! See, this is why I don't roll my own!
Jul
16
revised Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
clarification
Jul
16
comment Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
I think your edit went too far the other way. Alice knows Bob, Bob knows Alice, let's say by IP address on a LAN. I'm not sure whether you misunderstood me, or if you're just being pedantic with the aim of making a point.
Jul
16
comment S-box design criteria and random sboxes
I mentioned the reasons in the comments, but you should probably just ignore those to criteria. I didn't really understand the concept properly when I wrote that.
Jul
16
comment Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
Certificate authorities, as I mentioned, count as pre-shared information. They have to give their certificate to a trusted third party.
Jul
16
accepted Combatting traffic shape analysis with spurious packets
Jul
16
asked Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information?
Jul
16
comment S-box design criteria and random sboxes
Not quite a duplicate, but worth a read: crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1297/…
Jul
16
awarded  Benefactor
Jul
16
accepted Order of cascaded ciphers
Jul
16
accepted Padding methods for block ciphers - PKCS7 vs ANSI X.923
Jul
16
comment Padding methods for block ciphers - PKCS7 vs ANSI X.923
@Thomas After thinking about it, I realised that PKCS7 is slightly more resistant to bit-flipping damage. In X.923, a flipped bit (for whatever reason) in the final byte makes it difficult to "guess" the number of padding bytes. In PKCS7, you have a higher confidence in recovery since a single flipped bit in the padding doesn't destroy the length value. This could be a good thing (recovery of messages), or a bad thing (forensic analysis) in terms of the security of the mechanism. To be honest, I think the impact is so negligible it's not really worth the concern.