| bio | website | en.wikipedia.org/wiki/… |
|---|---|---|
| location | United Kingdom | |
| age | 25 | |
| visits | member for | 1 year, 6 months |
| seen | May 17 at 9:04 | |
| stats | profile views | 28 |
Pentester, ex-developer, security researcher, reverse engineer, electronics tinkerer, internet activist, zombie eradicator, promulgator of useless facts, shrubbery inspector, bacon aficionado.
Strengths: Security, Crypto, Win32 API, C#, .NET, PHP, x86 assembly
All answers and comments are encrypted with ROT256-ECB.
Opinions are my own. Advice provided with no warranty.
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? For every single block there are 16 rounds, i.e. $C_n = M_n$, then loop $C_n = S[K_r \oplus C_n]$ for $r = 0 \to 15$ for each block $n$. |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? @EthanHeilman - Done. |
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Nov 23 |
revised |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? re-added the original scheme |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? Sorry, must've missed it off my re-write. If you take a look at the edit history, you'll see my original design. It specifies 16 rounds of $C_n = S[K_r \oplus M_n]$ on each block. Would this result in any significant changes in the feasibility of the attacks you described? |
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Nov 23 |
awarded | Commentator |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? Does the known plaintext not get prevented by the use of multiple rounds? Since it's essentially $C_n = S[S[S[K_n \oplus M_n] \oplus M_{n+1}] \oplus M_{n+2} ... ]]]$ |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Desirable S-box properties It doesn't really explain why they made the choices they did, though. It just says "this is the S-box and these are the choices we made". I'm really looking for answers that provide both an explanation of the facts and the reasoning behind making the choices. |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Desirable S-box properties The output of the cipher has the avalanche property and appears random, but the construction of the S-box is not random. It's a case of not allowing any correlation, rather than specifying that a particular output is not allowed. |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? Just a note to anyone reading this and being confused (e.g. with poncho's mentioning of "Step 2"), there was a cleanup and the question was changed. You can view the original question in the edit history. |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Is a RSA-signature of some identifying data a safe way to implement a license key? Windows product IDs are NOT unique. Mass user OEM licenses have the same key for every machine. I'd suggest fetching the motherboard and C drive serial numbers instead (you can do this with WMI). |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Desirable S-box properties My rational is that S[a] = a provides no benefit and S[a] = !a will always maintain the same bit "pattern" as its input. Since the idea of an S-box is to provide "confusion" (as defined by Shannon), it seems reasonable to ensure that neither of these cases are allowed. I may, however, be incorrect. |
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Nov 23 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Nov 23 |
awarded | Editor |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? @poncho - Yes, that's correct. |
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Nov 23 |
revised |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? re-wrote to be more general |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
How can we reason about the cryptographic capabilities of code-breaking agencies like the NSA or GCHQ? They can always resort to the "Jack Bauer Side-Channel Attack", which involves them drilling holes in your kneecaps until you reveal the key. Billion dollar supercomputer or one agent with a $50 hammer drill... hey, I guess you can put a price on human rights! |
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Nov 23 |
awarded | Student |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? "In cryptography, a block cipher is a symmetric key cipher operating on fixed-length groups of bits, called blocks, with an unvarying transformation" - I'd say that my cipher fits that definition. Regardless, it's semantics, and its name doesn't affect its security (or lack thereof). I'm really just trying to learn here. |
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Nov 23 |
asked | Desirable S-box properties |
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Nov 23 |
comment |
Security of simple xor and s-box cipher? Yes, there is an inverse S-box. I don't see why there should be an issue with having CBC tied into my cipher design as long as I'm designing it only for CBC. |