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7h
comment Evidence of practical differential cryptanalysis attacks
That first sentence doesn't make much sense to me. Once an attack is found then I presume the cipher won't be used much more. Most results will be against experimental ciphers, and those will just not be used anymore, or they will be withdrawn from competitions.
15h
comment Software applications to learn cryptography
This question is way too broad. If you want to be taken more seriously, I would start by using appropriately formatted questions. I can understand that English is not your native language but any sentence that uses "wanna" in it raises a red flag on the stackexchange sites.
15h
revised Software applications to learn cryptography
changed wording
17h
revised Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
added 47 characters in body
17h
comment Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
You're welcome. If you are defining your protocol yourself and are unsure, place it at the end of the ciphertext and write this down in the protocol specification (but I guess I made that clear enough by now).
17h
comment Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
There is little use for a larger nonce, although any size can be used. If unsure, keep to the default. 128 bits is the largest sized tag and is recommended. It may be 96 to 128 bits with 8 bit (one byte) increments according to the spec.
19h
revised Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
added 25 characters in body
19h
revised Password length versus hash length?
password stretching = method, password strengthening = goal
19h
comment Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
I've just written a proposal for an international API specification that doesn't directly "tag the tag" to the end of the ciphertext. The size of the ciphertext was usually known in advance anyway, so the buffering just added unnecessary overhead on an already constrained system (and it messes up the symmetry with the encryption functionality, as that doesn't need to buffer).
19h
revised Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
added 111 characters in body
19h
comment Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
The GCM specification from NIST specifies the 96 bit nonce as default on 8.2.1 of the document. GCM is required to do additional calculations for differently sized IV's.
19h
answered Where is the authentication tag stored in file encrypted using AES-GCM?
20h
comment Adding two public keys
@RickyDemer My feeling is that the first paragraph does answer the question, but that the text should be clarified and further explained why and how it answers the question.
20h
answered Password length versus hash length?
1d
comment If you hashed a hash an infinite number of times would you end up with a unique hash?
For most secure hash functions with big enough output, you need a pretty big amount of times to get into a cycle. Not quite infinite (nothing is), but big enough for it not to be an issue in practice.
1d
comment Can a cryptographic hash be used as a cryptographic RNG?
If you are talking about KDF's you are talking about KBKDF (key based KDF's). In that case you may want to refer to NIST SP 800-108 (counter based KDF's) and HKDF, as well as KDF1/2. Some libraries may already have implementations.
2d
comment How are onetimepads distributed?
Yes. As explained you need as many bits from pad 1 to distribute pad 2. The net effect is that you have exactly as many bits left, minus the ones you used for the (encoded ) message of course. And the bits may be changed by an active attack on top of that.
Apr
23
answered How are onetimepads distributed?
Apr
23
revised Why use randomness in digital signature algorithms?
just rephrazing a sentence a bit so it reads more smoothly
Apr
23
comment Why rogued certificate from hash collision is harmful
Side node: it may be that the maximum path length is controlled by the CA certificates. In that case a well implemented client should not accept a leaf certificate for which the path length is out of range.