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Sep
19
answered Which is more secure using a CSPRNG for a One-time pad, or AES?
Sep
15
awarded  Nice Answer
Sep
14
revised Why RSA can't handle numbers above 76?
typo
Sep
14
revised Why RSA can't handle numbers above 76?
added practical demonstration
Sep
14
answered Why RSA can't handle numbers above 76?
Sep
13
comment fixing WEP by treating all messages as one long stream
Note you need to be careful with this approach: if the key is compromised, you lose both forward and backward secrecy (which are conserved to some extent if you change keys, perhaps using a KDF). Of course, it depends how long the stream is - you never set up a new key to send three bytes, but you do change the key every few dozen MB or so. But I am unsure how this "fixes WEP"...
Sep
13
answered Implementing AES encryption for firmware distribution system
Sep
11
revised modulus condition
post latex'd
Sep
11
comment modulus condition
By the way, did you mean 8k - 1 instead of 8(k - 1) in your inequality? Because the former requires the modulus to be 8k bits long, whereas the latter allows any bit length between 8k - 7 and 8k.
Sep
11
suggested suggested edit on modulus condition
Sep
11
comment modulus condition
I don't understand the question. These conditions are a mathematical way to describe the statement "the modulus n is 8k bits long". Try representing the numbers in binary, you'll see the conditions imply something about the binary representation of $n$! (hint: it forces one bit of $n$ to be 1...)
Sep
8
comment Can I combine two of SHA-3 candidates cryptography hash functions and obtain more secure Algorithm?
What makes you believe Skein is not secure enough for your purposes? More isn't always better in terms of security (and can, in specific cases, actually be worse), and in general there is a practical limit, in that throwing more iterations/cascades essentially changes nothing. Note, though, that if done properly, you can combine hash functions into something "better", but it's often not really elegant nor efficient. Also, if CPU cycles do not matter at all, I suggest iterating Skein an infinite number of times :-)
Sep
6
comment Password crackers in CUDA
Not appropriate to Crypto.SE (this is a website about theoretical cryptography), and furthermore product lists/requests are not on-topic on Stack Exchange.
Sep
5
comment Randomized stream cipher using multivariant quadratic equations
@SimonJohnson Oh, right, I see, my bad - I will delete my previous comment as it serves no purpose.
Sep
5
comment Why RC4 used constant 24bits for initial vector
Also note 40-bit keys are way too short to be secure nowadays, I could break one in a couple hours on the computer I'm on right now. You want 80 bits at the very least and 128-bit to be comfortable.
Sep
5
comment Why RC4 used constant 24bits for initial vector
We must not be looking at the same stream cipher, to my knowledge RC4 uses no constant value other than the identity permutation (0, 1, 2, ..., 255), and has a key up to 2048 bits long. If this is a custom implementation which uses an IV, we need to have references. You might be talking about the WEP protocol, which uses a 24-bit IV, if so, mention it.
Sep
2
comment How to encrypt data and know it will be secure for at least a few decades?
"Serpent alone should be safe for a few decades" That's one bold claim, and past history doesn't really support this conclusion. Care for some references? As for CSPRNG's, it would be better to hash their outputs together, as XOR'ing them can destroy entropy and in general do more harm than good.
Aug
31
comment No SHA-1 Collision? Yet SHA1 is broken?
As for alternatives, SHA-3 is just around the corner, so hang in there!
Aug
29
comment Random Sequence Generator function
No closed form function can describe a truly random permutation by definition. But if $N = 2^k$, then block ciphers come a significant fraction of the way.
Aug
28
comment Secure Hash Function based on AES
Would adding a feedforward step to the AES permutation function like so $\mathrm{Encrypt}(X) = E(X) \oplus X$ fix this vulnerability?