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Nov
8
revised Diffie-Hellman using a different modulus on both sides
Converted question to use LaTex formatting. Please let me know if this corresponds to what you had in mind. I am not really sure I understood your last equation, because to me it seems like it was just the same expression on both sides. Is what I wrote now what you had in mind?
Nov
8
suggested approved edit on Diffie-Hellman using a different modulus on both sides
Oct
19
comment What Diffie-Hellman parameters should I use?
I second the recommendation for elliptic curve DH over 2048-bit DH. Maybe you could add this to your answer?
Sep
30
revised How can a Encrypt-And-MAC scheme be insecure if the encryption is CCA secure?
added 575 characters in body
Sep
30
revised How can a Encrypt-And-MAC scheme be insecure if the encryption is CCA secure?
added 2 characters in body
Sep
29
answered How can a Encrypt-And-MAC scheme be insecure if the encryption is CCA secure?
Aug
26
comment Clarification of RFC2246 with regards to Finished Message
Is there a particular reason for why you are using the TLS 1.0 spec and not the TLS 1.2 spec?
Aug
7
comment Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?
And to partially answer your question: Yes, some deployed MACs are also PRFs. Like e.g. HMAC.
Aug
7
comment Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?
First, the IND-CPA game is meant for encryption schemes not MAC's. Secondly, in the IND-CPA game the adversary does not submit one message and gets back two ciphertexts. It's the other way around :-) I.e., he submits two messages and gets back the encryption of one of them. Thirdly, it seems to me now then, that the security notion you should be looking at regarding the MACs is PRF.
Aug
7
comment Are deployed MACs IND-CPA?
I'm a little confused by your title. The security notion usually targeted by MACs is unforgeability against a chosen message attacks (UF-CMA), not IND-CPA. It is not clear to me what it should mean for a MAC to satisfy IND-CPA. When you say that you want the MAC tag to be "random looking" did you mean this in the sense of the MAC being a PRF? Still, note that a MAC does not necessarily have to be a PRF in order to be UF-CMA (a PRF is a secure MAC though). Moreover, it is not necessary for the tag to be "random looking", as you say, in order for an AE scheme to be IND-CPA/IND-CCA secure.
Aug
6
revised Why does WPA-PSK not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange?
added 6 characters in body
Aug
6
comment Why does WPA-PSK not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange?
@Joost I agree with you. I have updated the answer accordingly. Hopefully this is more on point.
Aug
6
revised Why does WPA-PSK not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange?
Large update based on comments, discussing the benefit of DH.
Aug
6
revised Why does WPA-PSK not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange?
Large update based on comments, discussing the benefit of DH.
Aug
6
revised Why does WPA-PSK not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange?
Large update based on comments, discussing the benefit of DH.
Aug
5
answered UKS attack on KEA protocol
Jun
25
answered Dan Boneh's Cryptography lecture - problem with 802.11b
Apr
19
comment Prove there is PRG that is not necessarily one-to-one
@MaartenBodewes Please see the edit. Does that look OK?
Apr
19
revised Prove there is PRG that is not necessarily one-to-one
added 1591 characters in body
Apr
17
awarded  Yearling