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Nov
24
revised Flaw in the security definition of *Stateful* Authenticated Encryption?
added 29 characters in body
Nov
24
asked Flaw in the security definition of *Stateful* Authenticated Encryption?
Sep
30
answered how to mathematically prove a key exchange algorithm
Sep
10
comment Question about Fermat's little theorem
@Alex For the left-to-right implication in the first equivalence to hold true, you should probably add that $p \nmid a$.
Sep
4
revised RSA PCKS1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP algorithm
added 1 characters in body
Sep
4
revised RSA PCKS1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP algorithm
added 1 characters in body
Sep
3
revised RSA PCKS1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP algorithm
added 128 characters in body
Sep
3
revised RSA PCKS1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP algorithm
added 128 characters in body
Sep
3
answered RSA PCKS1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP algorithm
Jul
16
accepted Questions on rank-attacks in Multivariate Cryptography
May
30
comment What are the requirements of a nonce?
...what I'm trying to say is that, I think that a definition of a nonce should not impose ANY other requirements other than that it should not be used more than once. This does not forbid you from putting additional constraints on it.
May
30
comment What are the requirements of a nonce?
You asked for a definition of a nonce, and I provided what I consider to be the "right" notion; namely a value which is simply not used more than once (that's it!). Unfortunately there's much ambiguity in how the terms nonce and IV's are used in practice. So you might see several sources calling the first input to CBC-mode a nonce, whereas I would have preferred calling it an IV.
May
30
answered What are the requirements of a nonce?
May
8
awarded  Informed
Apr
19
comment PKC McEliece + $S$ + $P$
As per your own Wikipedia link: $S$ is simply any invertible binary $k \times k$ matrix, and $P$ is any $n \times n$ permutation matrix. What is it that you find unclear?
Mar
17
awarded  Yearling
Mar
16
accepted Proof of the standard pseudorandom generator + XOR encryption scheme in Goldreich
Mar
16
comment Proof of the standard pseudorandom generator + XOR encryption scheme in Goldreich
Exactly the answer I was looking for, thx! It's funny though: I had done exactly the same thing as you, including the consideration of the "triangle" inequality. But, when I got to your last equation, I couldn't figure out where that $1/2$ factor should come from. However, its good too see that I wasn't to far of :)
Mar
16
asked Proof of the standard pseudorandom generator + XOR encryption scheme in Goldreich
Feb
28
awarded  Commentator