| bio | website | github.com/CodesInChaos |
|---|---|---|
| location | Munich, Germany | |
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 11 months |
| seen | 1 hour ago | |
| stats | profile views | 112 |
- Jabber/XMPP: CodeInChaos@jabber.ccc.de
- IRC: CodesInChaos on freenode
- Email: My nick on gmail
- Blog: codesinchaos.wordpress.com
- GitHub: github.com/CodesInChaos
- Google+
- Twitter @CodesInChaos
|
1h |
comment |
Can two cipher letters per plaintext letter easily defeat character frequency analysis? Sounds like a homophonic substitution cipher. |
|
11h |
comment |
Reverse engineering from known ID inputs and 19/20-digits outputs If whoever wrote this knew what they were doing then they chose a secure 64 bit block cipher which you wouldn't be able to reverse without finding the key somewhere (for example in the source code) |
|
11h |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on Hash function with values in a multiplicative group of prime order |
|
1d |
comment |
Hash function with values in a multiplicative group of prime order which group are you using? |
|
1d |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on Can cryptography be used to hide routing information from the router? |
|
1d |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on Anonymity in end-to-end encryption |
|
Jun 15 |
comment |
Security of authenticated encryption modes gcm & ccm If robustness is more important than performance, then I prefer HMAC+encryption in a encrypt-then-MAC scheme over GCM and the like. |
|
Jun 15 |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on How do I decrypt ciphertext with this cipher? |
|
Jun 15 |
comment |
Can cryptography be used to hide routing information from the router? It's not obvious to me that homomorphic encryption helps here |
|
Jun 14 |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on Why is H(message||secret_key) not vulnerable to length-extension attack? |
|
Jun 14 |
revised |
Why is H(message||secret_key) not vulnerable to length-extension attack? added 64 characters in body |
|
Jun 14 |
reviewed | Approve suggested edit on understanding a length extension attack |
|
Jun 14 |
answered | Why is H(message||secret_key) not vulnerable to length-extension attack? |
|
Jun 14 |
comment |
Why is H(message||secret_key) not vulnerable to length-extension attack? You can perform a length extension, but then the message doesn't end with the secret key anymore and is thus not a valid authentication tag. |
|
Jun 14 |
comment |
Would this simple encrypted chat program be feasible using One Time Pads? @zuallauz D.W.'s point is valid. Security is only as strong as the weakest part. The strength of symmetric encryption(which your scheme tries to improve) is not the weakest part. It's also easy to increase the strength of symmetric crypto taking a minor performance hit, for example by cranking up the number of rounds or by using double encryption. The real problems are keeping the endpoints secure vs. malware, backdoors and physical access etc. and the key management i.e. how to securely get your partners (public) key) |
|
Jun 13 |
revised |
Scrypt as a KDF with one-time high-entropy input edited tags |
|
Jun 13 |
revised |
KDF with low-entropy salts edited tags |
|
Jun 13 |
revised |
Reason(s) for using a KDF for encryption keys edited tags |
|
Jun 13 |
revised |
brute force attack on KDF vs KEY edited tags |
|
Jun 13 |
revised |
What information to include is the 'info' input for HKDF? edited tags |