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| bio | website | github.com/CodesInChaos |
|---|---|---|
| location | Munich, Germany | |
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 10 months |
| seen | 21 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 109 |
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- GitHub: github.com/CodesInChaos
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Jul 16 |
comment |
Is MAC better than digital signature? "while a digital signature could be used where we currently use a MAC" I disagree. One-to-one and one-to-many authentication are different operations, and can't easily substitute for each other. Often Alice doesn't want Bob to be able to prove to Carol what she said. |
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Jul 16 |
comment |
Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information? You should post a summary of your source. Your post is utterly useless without the linked material. |
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Jul 16 |
comment |
Is it possible to ensure security with zero pre-shared information? It's obviously impossible. You need to know at least something. For example you could have the public key double as address. |
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Jul 15 |
comment |
How much time will it take to crack Traditional DES encryption? Are you talking about DES encryption, or the DES bases crypt hashing scheme? |
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Jul 14 |
revised |
why do we need Diffie Hellman? added 33 characters in body |
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Jul 14 |
comment |
idea of new mode of operation might be secure Or just write some code (pseudo or real, as long as its a normal looking language) |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Which of these 3 AES 128 symmetric encrypt/decrypt routines is most secure? Not sure where you bring CCM from, we were talking about CTR. Padding oracles don't apply to CTR at all. And with CBC+HMAC you're immune if you apply the MAC to ciphertext, since you now reject the invalid message before you decrypt and validate the padding. |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Which of these 3 AES 128 symmetric encrypt/decrypt routines is most secure? Another practical advantage is that HMAC is already implemented in .net, but you need to implement GCM yourself. |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Which of these 3 AES 128 symmetric encrypt/decrypt routines is most secure? A 12 byte nonce is pretty short. It becomes dangerous once 2^48 messages get generated with the same key. I already feel uncomfortable with 16 byte nonces in some situations. I'm also somewhat paranoid about PRNG failures. |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Is the encryption of a hash a good MAC? Note that hash(k||data) is secure for the next generation of hash functions, including all SHA-3 finalists. |
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Jul 13 |
answered | Which of these 3 AES 128 symmetric encrypt/decrypt routines is most secure? |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Is the encryption of a hash a good MAC? It certainly has worse properties compared to HMAC, thanks to low collision resistance of this scheme. In particular 128 bit MACs which are fine with HMAC, are too weak with your scheme. |
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Jul 13 |
comment |
Different implementations of SHA1, which one is correct? Sounds like something encoding related, but not UTF-8 vs. ASCII. Perhaps UTF-16? |
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Jul 12 |
comment |
Signatures: RSA compared to ECDSA Sounds like a slow ECC implementation. eBacs results seem to be a bit better. bench.cr.yp.to/results-sign.html |
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Jul 12 |
revised |
Signatures: RSA compared to ECDSA added 235 characters in body; added 87 characters in body |
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Jul 12 |
answered | Signatures: RSA compared to ECDSA |
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Jul 12 |
comment |
Signatures: RSA compared to ECDSA ECDSA signatures are around 64 bytes |
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Jul 10 |
comment |
Which of these 3 AES 128 symmetric encrypt/decrypt routines is most secure? The MAC in AES-GCM isn't HMAC. |
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Jul 10 |
comment |
KDF with low-entropy salts The only advantage of that over a direct brute-force is that it can be done before the leak. It doesn't reduce the total work an attacker has to do at all. |
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Jul 10 |
revised |
KDF with low-entropy salts added 196 characters in body |
