| bio | website | github.com/CodesInChaos |
|---|---|---|
| location | Munich, Germany | |
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 11 months |
| seen | 3 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 112 |
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May 24 |
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What is the fastest elliptic curve operation f(P) in affine coordinates such that f^n(P)=P only if n is large? Can you describe what problem you actually want to solve? |
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May 22 |
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How much data can I encrypt with AES before I need to change the key in CBC mode? Another part of risk management is assessing how big the damage is. For an IV collision with AES-CBC it's typically not very big. |
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May 20 |
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Is Wikipedia's table about SHA-2 collisions correct? The :24 is probably referring to a version reduced to 24 rounds. |
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May 15 |
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calculating beta for elgamal elliptic curves I'd use an existing ECC library which offers a scalar multiplication function. But if you implement it yourself you can look at the Explicit-Formulas Database which as addition/doubling formulas for many curve forms. |
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May 15 |
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calculating beta for elgamal elliptic curves @BobbDizzles You need to look up the point addition and doubling formulas for your curve form. |
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May 15 |
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Generating IV in TLS 1.2RNGCryptoServiceProvider isn't that slow. It just has a large per-call overhead, so you need to ask for a few kilobytes in a single call. On my notebook it can generate around 4 million IVs (with 16 bytes each) per second on a single core. |
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May 12 |
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Designing a security system from scratch with a custom protocol, suggestions needed 1) Cryptography is all about leaving things to chance, just with really small chances. 2) Adding a MAC is essential. HMAC in a encrypt-then-mac contruction is one good solution, dedicated authenticated encryption like AES-GCM another. |
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May 12 |
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Can someone help with the following hashes? It doesn't look like one of the common encodings like hex or base64. |
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May 11 |
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Does SRP reduce to DH key echange when shared password is not secret? And you don't just need a BigInt library for SRP. If you go that way you will most likely be vulnerable to timing attacks. You need a specialized library that does exponentiation in constant time to do DH or SRP. |
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May 11 |
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Does SRP reduce to DH key echange when shared password is not secret? Since SRP uses DH as a building block, you need a DH implementation anyways. |
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May 10 |
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Finding hash almost-collisions I don't get how you go from $2^{52}$ to $2^{26}$, considering this is a near pre-image, not a near collision. |
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May 10 |
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Finding hash almost-collisions Your math can't be right, $2^{26}$ is far too low to win such a competition. That's less than a CPU minute on a single core. I'd expect them to easily exceed $2^{40}$. I wouldn't be surprised if they managed $2^{51}$ operations with ATI GPUs. |
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May 10 |
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Security of Salsa20 with some known plaintext? @davidkomer It's essential to use a distinct nonce for every message you encrypt. If you do that, Salsa20 is pretty secure. You should also consider adding authentication, so active attacks are rejected. |
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May 10 |
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Security of Salsa20 with some known plaintext? @D.W. Salsa20 is a stream cipher. It always uses something similar to CTR mode. |
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May 9 |
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Recommended way of adding a pepper/secret key to password before hashing? I would encrypt the hash |
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May 8 |
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Many consecutive hashes to slow down brute force attack? The entropy loss due to collisions is negligible. Nobody has ever found even a single SHA-256 collision. There is no practical security difference between hashing a salted password multiple times and PBKDF2. |
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Apr 29 |
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Adding and multiplication in jacobian coordinates Once again, what do you mean by "multiplication of 2 points"? I don't think this is a supported operation on elliptic curves. |
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Apr 29 |
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Secure order preserving hash function Your requirements are simply a contradiction. Order preservation allows binary search which allows trivial and efficient inversion of any unkeyed function. |
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Apr 29 |
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Secure order preserving hash function Your requirement trivially allows a binary search to recover the the message in a chosen plaintext scenario. It's also easy to prove that the only way to satisfy the condition is order preserving encryption. So I have no clue what you even mean by an oder preserving hash. |
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Apr 29 |
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Counter Mode: static IV but different keys For secure network protocols you typically run an ephemeral key-exchange at the beginning, so you end up with a unique master key in any case. So using nonce=0 is actually a bit easier, but generating a random nonce is very easy as well. |