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| bio | website | xagawa.net |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 1 month |
| seen | 4 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 4 |
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May 6 |
comment |
Indistinguishability attack example What you should do is proposing an attack and estimating its advantage. How does your adversary choose two plaintexts? |
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May 1 |
awarded | Yearling |
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May 1 |
revised |
Sematically Secure McEliece Add the reference. |
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May 1 |
revised |
Sematically Secure McEliece added 1 characters in body |
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May 1 |
answered | Sematically Secure McEliece |
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Apr 30 |
suggested | suggested edit on Sematically Secure McEliece |
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Apr 5 |
revised |
Efficient decoding of irreducible binary Goppa codes and the role of matrix P in McEliece cryptosystem Add links to ePrint archive and JoMC. |
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Apr 5 |
suggested | suggested edit on Efficient decoding of irreducible binary Goppa codes and the role of matrix P in McEliece cryptosystem |
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Mar 27 |
comment |
Alice trusts Bob only when Bob trusts Alice I guess "(optimistic) fair exchange" might be the answer. How about it? |
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Mar 23 |
revised |
reduces the coefficients of a modulo 3 on NTRU Clear mathematical representations. |
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Mar 23 |
suggested | suggested edit on reduces the coefficients of a modulo 3 on NTRU |
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Mar 20 |
comment |
Proof of the standard pseudorandom generator + XOR encryption scheme in Goldreich Suppose the two absolute values are at most 1/(2p), then you get 1/p < |...| + |...| <= 2 * 1/(2p) = 1/p, that is, contradiction. |
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Mar 17 |
comment |
Does Linear Cramer-Shoup have pseudo-random ciphertexts? Hi Henrick. Did you read the proof? In page 5, Shacham constructed a DLIN solver B from an IND-CCA2 distinguisher A. |
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Mar 17 |
awarded | Critic |
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Mar 16 |
answered | Proof of the standard pseudorandom generator + XOR encryption scheme in Goldreich |
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Mar 13 |
comment |
Zero-Knowledge Challenge-Responce Protocol Why don't you google with the keywords, say, "Sigma, DDH, Zero-Knowledge"? I found a nice lecture note written by Berry Schoenmakers. |
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Mar 13 |
revised |
Zero-Knowledge Challenge-Responce Protocol Add links to the Sigma protocol for DDH. |
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Mar 10 |
answered | Current Status of mixnets for voting |
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Mar 10 |
comment |
Zero-Knowledge Challenge-Responce Protocol My answer referred to the same point. As you know, r_{id} is the voter's identity. The polling station has (g,g^x,r_{id},\sigma) and the RA has x. If \sigma = r_{id}^x, then the RA can prove that (g,g^x,r,\sigma) is the DDH tuple. |
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Mar 7 |
answered | Zero-Knowledge Challenge-Responce Protocol |
