| bio | website | |
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| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | Apr 24 at 3:58 | |
| stats | profile views | 34 |
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Feb 23 |
answered | Why are the constants so simple in Keccak? |
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Aug 17 |
awarded | Nice Question |
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Aug 2 |
awarded | Yearling |
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Mar 29 |
comment |
Can a user of a password-protected Wi-Fi sniff on other user's communication? When I've looked into wifi hacking, it sounds like a pretty common technique is to DoS the client over the air until it drops and reconnects. I believe this allows the attacker to observe the nonces exchanged at the initial handshake. |
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Mar 21 |
comment |
Is the SILC protocol still used? Probably mpOTR would be a better choice for new usage. |
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Mar 6 |
answered | Is the SILC protocol still used? |
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Jan 7 |
comment |
Implementation of Tao Xie and Denguo Feng's MD5 attack No, he asked about a specific attack. The link you posted is from 2005. |
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Dec 14 |
comment |
What does SSL use? RSA? El-Gamal? Elliptic curves? DSA is based on El-Gamal, so you could use DSA certificates. But you're right, no one does. |
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Sep 13 |
awarded | Enthusiast |
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Sep 11 |
comment |
How do I construct a 256-bit hash function from 128-bit AES? I had to do this years back for something inconsequential. I'm sure that what I came up with is crappy. Thankfully, what I though was inconsequential back then remains inconsequential today, but that is notoriously hard to predict in advance. Other times that has not been the case. |
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Sep 11 |
comment |
How do I construct a 256-bit hash function from 128-bit AES? You feel that 'Hirose - Some Plausible Constructions of Double-Block-Length Hash Functions' iacr.org/archive/fse2006/40470213/40470213.pdf is insufficiently vetted? |
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Sep 1 |
comment |
How are constructs with data-dependent swaps and rotations cryptanalyzed? If only I could have accepted both answers. Instead, I flipped a fair coin. |
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Sep 1 |
accepted | How are constructs with data-dependent swaps and rotations cryptanalyzed? |
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Sep 1 |
comment |
How can we reason about the cryptographic capabilities of code-breaking agencies like the NSA or GCHQ? I think it's an interesting question and one that every user of cryptography outside of the US Government itself must be asking. While it's true that an organization such as the NSA gives up very little information about its capabilities (and the question could be more general and apply to all such organizations) the amount of information is non-zero. Even in the absence of information, the question degenerates to another interesting and important question: why should we have confidence that algorithm X is secure in principle? |
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Aug 28 |
revised |
How to collect, process, and transmit data securely? minor grammar |
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Aug 28 |
comment |
If a cryptanalytic breakthrough is made, what process should be followed? First of all, you should never assume that you're the only party that knows about it. |
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Aug 28 |
comment |
If a cryptanalytic breakthrough is made, what process should be followed? I think there's enough history and data at this point that we can say full disclosure is a good principle and default course of action. Generally the only parties opposed to it are those who actually want (perversely) the vulnerable state to persist longer. |
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Aug 28 |
answered | How to collect, process, and transmit data securely? |
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Aug 26 |
comment |
Does MD5 generate 128 independent bits? I'm far from an expert on this topic, but it seems to me that MD5 is completely deterministic, so when does it even make sense to ask about its stochastic properties? E.g., maybe in an attack context we could state something in terms of the absence of any (tractable) expression to constrain the input domain only slightly but that significantly modifies the distribution of some expression made from the output (or output and input) bits. |
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Aug 26 |
comment |
Does MD5 generate 128 independent bits? Hmm, if the input is "random and at least of the output size" even the identity function achieves independence among the output bits. Is that a reasonable constraint for any useful interpretation of the question? The other extreme of two inputs seems like a better interpretation for crypto.se. An adversarial environment probably needs to be concerned with the worst case. |