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| visits | member for | 11 months |
| seen | Apr 25 at 21:45 | |
| stats | profile views | 3 |
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Jun 19 |
comment |
Distinguishing Encryption Methods from the Output So, the answer is yes, thanks! As Poncho and Maeher have pointed out, it would be possible to change our protocols to conceal this bit. I wonder if anybody would feel insecure knowing that packet sniffers can tell how often they ask for a certificate...but I guess the sniffer gains a lot more information from knowledge of the traffic volume. Are there any protocols in regular use that "pad a lot" to create high volume at all times (thereby concealing more information)? |
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Jun 19 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Jun 19 |
accepted | Distinguishing Encryption Methods from the Output |
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Jun 19 |
awarded | Student |
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Jun 18 |
comment |
Distinguishing Encryption Methods from the Output "They can't encrypt any messages", you say. But, the client could use RSA encryption with the server's public key right after reboot, right? In theory, no eavesdropper should know then whether this is truly RSA or a continuation of the previous AES. But, the server could try both options and figure it out. |
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Jun 18 |
asked | Distinguishing Encryption Methods from the Output |