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visits member for 2 years, 2 months
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I SHALL DEVOUR YOUR HEART AND FEAST ON YOUR SOUL (so don't bug me).


Sep
24
awarded  Autobiographer
Aug
10
awarded  Yearling
Jun
12
answered Is a collision attack possible on MD5 if message is known partially
Jan
18
answered Does having multiple hash iterations of the same message weaken your original message security?
Sep
22
comment OpenSSL padding
By definition, when you decrypt, the decryption engine removes the padding. So that engine reliably detects the padding length; this is why PKCS#5 always adds at least one byte (otherwise, the padding would be ambiguous). However, you cannot know the padding length without decrypting. As for encryption, then just look at the length of the data before and after encryption.
Sep
22
answered OpenSSL padding
Sep
19
answered What is the lowest level of mathematics required in order to understand how encryption algorithms work?
Aug
10
awarded  Yearling
Jul
31
comment AES encryption using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
I have, personally, implemented a fully-compliant SSL stack (client and server) which fits in 20 kB of compiled code and 17 kB of RAM. SSL can be small. The point here is that a secure protocol will have to include a lot of SSL-like features, to the point that you cannot really do smaller than a small SSL implementation (unless you don't mind glaring weaknesses). So the sensible thing is to use the standard, i.e. SSL, where all hard details have already been thought out.
Jul
31
answered AES encryption using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Mar
8
comment Security of tokenization of plain text conversations - cryptanalysis
@Sid: they may bother to use AES in order to be able to claim that they use AES. Using AES does not mean that you are secure (for that, you have to use AES properly, i.e. not like they do).
Mar
7
answered Security of tokenization of plain text conversations - cryptanalysis
Aug
26
comment How to submit a new method of encryption?
Modulo-2-addition ? I.e. "xor" ?
Aug
10
comment Blum Blum Shub vs. AES-CTR or other CSPRNGs
@D.W.: he would still be fine, though. As you show, there is very little protection to be obtained from the "security proof". But, in practice, nobody knows how to break a BBS except by factoring the modulus, and nobody knows how to factor a 2048-bit modulus with existing technology. A 2048-bit BBS is "as secure" as a 2048-bit RSA in that sense: people looked at it, nobody found a way to break it. I have no qualms in recommending 2048-bit RSA, which has no proof of security at all; even NIST does it. The same should apply to BBS. (Except that BBS is too slow to be of much use, of course.)
Aug
10
awarded  Teacher
Aug
3
answered Blum Blum Shub vs. AES-CTR or other CSPRNGs