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seen Mar 4 at 13:49

Feb
6
comment Homomorphic encryption for vector addition
Oh, ok. I am ok with anything with a large and identical p,q,r. Three signed 64-bit values is plenty for this.
Feb
5
comment Homomorphic encryption for vector addition
@mikeazo - do you want to add an answer about the SIMD FHE you mentioned on the other question comment?
Feb
5
comment Homomorphic encryption for vector addition
D.W. - Thanks for the added detail. I tried to get some help understanding your response on chat, but didn't get far. What is the significance of p, q, and r? My first guess is that it is related to the bit-size of x, y, and z since Z/pZ is an integer field mod p, right? - so 2^32 if they're 32-bit (although signed is preferred). But I think that's a bad guess since you seem to anticipate that p, q, and r would be different and perhaps prime.
Jan
31
comment Addition-only PHE in F#
ok, ready: Homomorphic encryption for vector addition I did not mention SIMD because I didn't want to steal your thunder.
Jan
31
comment Addition-only PHE in F#
But if I wanted to extend this to multiple dimensions, I'd need Gentry? $(\varepsilon(x), \varepsilon(y), \varepsilon(z))$ is not as ideal as $\varepsilon((x, y, z))$ because I don't want the components to be reusable independently like that. Is there an encoding of $(x, y, z)$ that makes it compatible with the simple $\oplus$?
Jan
31
comment Addition-only PHE in F#
Thanks! The padding thing was due to my impression that HE is an undesirable property normal crypto uses and thus padding is added which interferes with HE, i.e. multiplication in RSA. But whatever, this is good info, thanks.
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
Ok, I guess that could work, setting it to 1. But that particular algorithm is intended for a different purpose of dividing the secret - not just sharing it. I think the same benefit can be achieved with more common algorithms, is all.
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
Also, Shamir's Secret Sharing is when I'd want /some or all/ of the members to be necessary to decrypt the key. This is not good for my intended use.
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
Yes, KeyPass with the ability to share one of your secrets with someone else's database. What multiple layers of shared secrets do you mean?
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
It's not concurrent write access - that's the point of one file per user. I write to my database my own secrets. I have a list of trusted targets (each family member's public key read from their database). Each of my secrets' keys are encrypted using my own public key, but also (separately) by the public keys of each share target that I have chosen. They can read from this file and decrypt the shared secrets' keys with their private key.
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
Great links. Thanks. Yeah, I'd like to avoid domain-specific services. I see value in a scheme that doesn't require a server or many moving parts. Just a file that you can store on a shared network folder, etc. KeyPass desktop with the ability to share one of your secrets with someone else's database.
Aug
22
comment Security considerations for partially shared password databases
@AndrewSmith - what in blue blazes are you talking about?