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| bio | website | |
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| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | Feb 6 at 14:14 | |
| stats | profile views | 18 |
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Jun 1 |
comment |
Replay attack prevention under strict conditions @PaŭloEbermann The authenticated party sends the requests and the other party responds. In that sense it is very similar to HTTP(S). |
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Jun 1 |
comment |
Replay attack prevention under strict conditions My apologies @CodeInChaos, it seems I initially misunderstood your concept. Thank you everyone for the help. |
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Jun 1 |
accepted | Replay attack prevention under strict conditions |
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Jun 1 |
comment |
Replay attack prevention under strict conditions By not sequential I mean that requests should be able to be sent in parallel without errors caused by the defense mechanism. I have considered a similar idea to the one you proposed, unfortunately both violate the "sequential rule". Say I send a request A, and then a request B. There is no guarantee that request A will arrive before request B (request A might be orders of magnitude larger), hence this will cause errors. Leaving space for these errors is, by definition, bound to cause replay attack opportunities. |
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Jun 1 |
revised |
Replay attack prevention under strict conditions added 76 characters in body |
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Jun 1 |
asked | Replay attack prevention under strict conditions |
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May 23 |
comment |
How were the number of rounds for different key sizes of AES selected? As to the choice for the round numbers? Have a look at this document: csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/Rijndael-ammended.pdf. Note the "Number of rounds" section under "Motivation for design choices". |
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May 21 |
comment |
How were the number of rounds for different key sizes of AES selected? $N_r = len(key)/4 + 6$. |
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May 3 |
revised |
Creating an encryption key from several other keys and using hash functions added 2 characters in body |
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May 3 |
answered | Creating an encryption key from several other keys and using hash functions |
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Apr 26 |
comment |
Identifying cryptography cipher 64-bit block size. P-array of 18 32-bit subkeys. 4 32-bit S-boxes with 256 entries each. Blowfish. |
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Apr 22 |
awarded | Talkative |
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Apr 22 |
comment |
How to perform file encryption using 128-Bit AES? let us continue this discussion in chat |
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Apr 22 |
comment |
How to perform file encryption using 128-Bit AES? @John Paul Parreño Such questions are better suited for Stack Overflow. Word of advice, if you are new to cryptography and wish to implement a cipher yourself, I'd suggest trying something simpler than AES at first, such as RC6. |
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Apr 22 |
comment |
Does the Biclique attack on AES pose a credible risk to its security? At the moment, no cryptanalytic attack on full AES is computationally feasible. Hence, there is no practical threat. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard#Security |
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Apr 22 |
comment |
ID-Secret Scheme True. This was the first crypto-protocol I attempted to design and there are of course obvious flaws and design oversights. As for the problem faced, asymmetric cryptography proved to be an excellent solution. |
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Apr 22 |
accepted | ID-Secret Scheme |
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Feb 23 |
comment |
How can one share information using the 'host-proof' paradigm? @Travis In Adobe Air you can sign your applications with a certificate issued by a recognized certification authority. The problem with cryptography in AS3 is that it is slow. Thankfully there is a way to circumvent this limitation: using Air Native Extensions, but this requires you to publish your applications as native installers which cannot be signed. If speed is not a requirement, this may be a viable solution on first thought. |
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Feb 22 |
comment |
Which one of the Block Cipher modes is the best? @Paŭlo Ebermann The SSL vulnerability you describe is present in TLS 1.0 and lower, not only in SSL 3.0. |
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Feb 22 |
accepted | Combating traffic analysis over request-response protocols |
