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| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | Feb 6 at 14:14 | |
| stats | profile views | 18 |
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Sep 27 |
comment |
Preventing message replay with RSA How will including a signed random value solve the problem? How does the recipient know that the nonce hasn't been repeated without storing every previous nonce? |
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Sep 27 |
awarded | Commentator |
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Sep 27 |
comment |
Preventing message replay with RSA For my purposes, the expiration time is time+5 seconds. That gives an attacker a 5 second window to attack. For my system, a single replay can be destructive. |
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Sep 27 |
asked | Preventing message replay with RSA |
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Sep 7 |
accepted | Layered XOR Cipher |
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Sep 7 |
asked | Layered XOR Cipher |
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Aug 23 |
comment |
Why does nobody use (or break) the Camellia Cipher? Yes, Yahoo! uses Camellia as the bulk cipher when TLS is used. What is more interesting is that they use a 1024-bit certificate... |
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Aug 21 |
comment |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? Thanks but SPEKE doesn't require the password in cleartext on the server-side, the password can be stored in cleartext, as hash(password) or as hash(password)^2... |
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Aug 20 |
comment |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? Which PAKE method would you suggest, SRP or SPEKE and why? |
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Aug 20 |
accepted | Why does nobody use (or break) the Camellia Cipher? |
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Aug 20 |
asked | Why does nobody use (or break) the Camellia Cipher? |
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Aug 19 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Aug 19 |
accepted | Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? |
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Aug 18 |
awarded | Editor |
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Aug 18 |
comment |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? I have edit the question to clear any confusion, I apologize for the unclarity. |
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Aug 18 |
comment |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? I have edit the question to clear any confusion, I apologize for the unclarity. |
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Aug 18 |
comment |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? I have edit the question to clear any confusion, I apologize for the unclarity. |
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Aug 18 |
revised |
Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? added 1652 characters in body |
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Aug 18 |
asked | Is public-key cryptography the only option in this scenario? |
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Aug 3 |
comment |
ID-Secret Scheme For the first update, HMAC(secret, ID) is used so that an attacker cannot find the ID (which I'm trying to keep secret). In other words HMAC(secret, ID) is used as an identification token if you will... The second part of the message (the ciphertext) carries the authentication request. Each ID has a corresponding SECRET to Party 2, so Party 2 needs to: see if HMAC(secret, ID) exists, and if so check if the ciphertext can be decrypted with the corresponding SECRET. For the second update, as the result of the ciphertext can be validated, there is no need for a message MAC. |
