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| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | 53 mins ago | |
| stats | profile views | 137 |
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Feb 22 |
answered | Computational indistinguishability and example of non polynomial algorithm |
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Feb 20 |
answered | Why is RSA encryption significantly faster than decryption? |
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Feb 18 |
comment |
AES encryption with shared IV If you follow this strategy, make sure to use a different key for generating the IV from the counter than you use for the actual encryption (where you use that IV), otherwise bad things could possibly happen. |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Low complexity implementation of a small blocksize cipher (< 64 bit) @TheLazyEngineer, it sounds like you might be making one of the most common crypto mistakes around: you are using encryption without message authentication, which is usually a mistake. It's important to use message authentication, to prevent forgery (and by the way, if you do, then your concerns about avalanche will go away). |
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Feb 15 |
comment |
Low complexity implementation of a small blocksize cipher (< 64 bit) I think PRESENT is optimized for hardware implementations. I don't know whether there's a variant with a 44-bit block size. If you're OK with a 64-bit or larger block size, Skipjack and RC5 are also worth a look: they're very convenient for embedded microprocessors. |
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Feb 15 |
comment |
Low complexity implementation of a small blocksize cipher (< 64 bit) @Thomas, yes. I agree with everything you wrote. On your question: Yes, $1 - e^{-b^2/2^{45}}$ is a more accurate estimate. However, if $b$ is much less than $2^{22}$, then $1 - e^{-b^2/2^{45}}$ is approximately equal to $b^2/2^{45}$ (using the approximation $e^{-x} \approx 1-x$ when $x>0$ is much smaller than 1). |
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Feb 15 |
answered | Extract private RSA key from USB cryptographic token using Bardou et al. attack (varian of “million message attack”) |
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Feb 15 |
answered | Low complexity implementation of a small blocksize cipher (< 64 bit) |
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Feb 13 |
revised |
Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) package -> packet |
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Feb 13 |
comment |
Can one reduce the size of ECDSA-like signatures? "the Prover commits to a random value $k$ and then proves that he knows $x/k$" - This is a nifty insight. Thank you! It seems like it can't be exactly correct: it doesn't seem like it's the Schnorr protocol adapted to prove knowledge of $x/k$, due to the presence of $h$. Intuitively I see why this reasoning makes a connection plausible, though. Is there any way to make this more formal/precise/accurate? |
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Feb 12 |
revised |
Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) added 359 characters in body; added 451 characters in body; added 239 characters in body |
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Feb 12 |
revised |
Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) added 1040 characters in body; added 66 characters in body |
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Feb 12 |
answered | Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) |
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Feb 12 |
answered | Is semantic security important in a hybrid cryptosystem? |
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Feb 12 |
comment |
Is semantic security important in a hybrid cryptosystem? You have two questions here: (a) is semantic security important, and (b) should we use PKCS #1 1.5 encryption? I suggest you might want to split off (b) into a separate question. |
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Feb 12 |
revised |
Why is OCB-AES mode not becoming a standard for authenticated encryption? added 477 characters in body |
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Feb 11 |
answered | PBKDF2 for key diversification |
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Feb 11 |
comment |
Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) It might help to have a more detailed specification of the situation. What compression algorithm was the data compressed with? DEFLATE? What does "I'm stuck with" mean? Do you have known plaintext? In other words, do you know the entire input to zlib? Part of the input? Do you know anything about the key, or is a uniformly random 64-bit value? |
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Feb 11 |
revised |
Attack XOR encryption of binary data compressed by zlib with known key length (very short key) deleted 1 characters in body; added 217 characters in body; edited tags |
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Feb 11 |
revised |
Is AES reducible to an NP-complete problem? remove erroneous premises |
