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| bio | website | |
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| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | 23 mins ago | |
| stats | profile views | 137 |
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Jan 10 |
comment |
How secure is the knapsack? @Jus12, ok, sounds good! My suggestion is to read the literature on known attacks on knapsack systems, and that should let you pick parameters that defeat all known attacks. (An extra caveat: I expect that, for natural parameter settings, if you pick a uniformly random $X$, then with high probability there will be no solution, i.e., no subset $S$ of weights will sum to $X$. Make sure that's OK in your application.) |
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Jan 10 |
answered | How secure is the knapsack? |
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Jan 10 |
revised |
What is the progress on the MIT LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle? added 36 characters in body |
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Jan 10 |
answered | What is the progress on the MIT LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle? |
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Jan 10 |
comment |
What is the progress on the MIT LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle? @Pierre, this is pretty much covered in Rivest's scientific paper that goes with this. (The chances that $2^t$ is the order of $2$ in the group is vanishingly small. Part of the whole point is that $n$ is chosen so that it is hard to factor, and its factors are not known. And so on.) |
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Jan 10 |
answered | What is “Blinding” used for in cryptography? |
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Jan 10 |
awarded | Excavator |
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Jan 10 |
revised |
Deriving Keys for Symmetric Encryption and Authentication added 195 characters in body |
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Jan 10 |
comment |
Creating an encryption key from several other keys and using hash functions While xor would work in this particular case, it is less robust -- e.g., it becomes vulnerable if any of the keys are supplied by an untrusted party. Therefore, I prefer the @CodesInChaos's method of hashing the concatenation of the keys. |
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Jan 10 |
revised |
Creating an encryption key from several other keys and using hash functions clarify answer to another question. |
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Jan 10 |
revised |
Deriving Keys for Symmetric Encryption and Authentication added 656 characters in body |
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Jan 10 |
awarded | Revival |
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Jan 9 |
answered | Deriving Keys for Symmetric Encryption and Authentication |
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Jan 9 |
comment |
Common Modulus Attack in a Lucas Group phku, I think we need to see a specification of the encryption algorithm you are using before we can tell you how to attack it. How is the ciphertext $(x_A,y_A)$ computed from the message? (You should describe the public-key encryption scheme, in a way that is accessible to everyone and doesn't require paying money.) |
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Jan 9 |
comment |
Common Modulus Attack in a Lucas Group I don't see how this answers the question. The question was "Do I need to perform this operation in the Lucas group? As it stands all of my values are scalar." |
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Jan 9 |
comment |
Break double encryption I encourage you to read the FAQ on homework questions. In particular, the FAQ asks you to show your work: show us what you've tried so far, where you've gotten stuck, etc. See also Paŭlo Ebermann♦'s answer. The problem is your question is too much like "Do my homework for me" and not enough like "Here is my task, I already did this part, and I have now this problem. Here is what I tried, but which didn't work." |
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Jan 7 |
revised |
Properties of Ideal Straight P-Boxes added 156 characters in body |
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Jan 7 |
comment |
Properties of Ideal Straight P-Boxes @Thomas, P-boxes cannot (on their own) provide any diffusion, since they just re-order the bits. |
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Jan 7 |
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Properties of Ideal Straight P-Boxes @ponsfonze, this doesn't answer the question; it just repeats what Wikipedia says the definition of a "straight P-box" is, but it doesn't answer what properties an ideal one should exhibit. |
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Jan 7 |
revised |
Properties of Ideal Straight P-Boxes added 2 characters in body |
