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| visits | member for | 1 year, 9 months |
| seen | 21 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 137 |
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Nov 1 |
comment |
Computer appliance protocol Sounds like a question that's better-suited for the IT Security site. |
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Nov 1 |
answered | CPA Secure Chosen plaintext scheme |
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Nov 1 |
comment |
Proving that a scheme is not IND-CPA-secure I think the answer will depend upon the particular textbook you are using, and how they define $\text{Game}^CPA_A$. It sounds to me like your question could be paraphrased as: please help me understand what the definition of IND-CPA security means, and help me work through the details. That's probably going to depend upon the precise formulation of IND-CPA that your textbook or instructor happens to be using. |
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Oct 31 |
comment |
Is there a practical zero-knowledge proof for this special discrete log equation? @SDL, I was thinking of $\textrm{commit}(x_2) = (g^{x_3}, x_2 h^{x_3})$, but I just now realized this might be problematic: this is binding for everyone, but not concealing against the person who holds the private key (the person who knows the discrete log of $h$ to base $g$ can infer what value was committed to without permission), which I suspect might not meet your needs. So, I withdraw my previous comment. Sorry for my error. |
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Oct 31 |
revised |
Is there a practical zero-knowledge proof for this special discrete log equation? edited body |
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Oct 31 |
comment |
How can I prove in zero knowldege that an ElGamal shuffle is correct for a special setting? @SDL, if g,h,x2 are known to the verifier, you should be able to use standard techniques for proof of knowledge of a discrete log. If x2 is not known to the verifier, then I would need to understand better how the scheme works to have an opinion; however, if you have the freedom to pick a different, more convenient commitment scheme, I expect there'll probably be efficient solutions (e.g., using a zk proof that two El Gamal ciphertexts decrypt to the same plaintext). |
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Oct 31 |
comment |
How can I prove in zero knowldege that an ElGamal shuffle is correct for a special setting? @SDL, I'm puzzled by your statement. I can't think of any mixnet that requires a shared secret. A basic mixnet protocol has only one party: the mixer (who permutes and re-encrypts/decrypts the ciphertexts provided as input, and then proves to the rest of the world that this computation was done correctly). I don't know how familiar you are with mixnets; might it be worth spending a little more time reviewing the variety of schemes and how they work? |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Real world use cases of Multi Party Computation |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Counter mode secure hash algorithm |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Modifications of CBC-MAC |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Messages of different lengths and one-time computationally-secret |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Why is an Encrypt-and-MAC scheme with deterministic MAC not IND-CPA secure? |
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Oct 31 |
revised |
Is an RSA variant with public exponent $e=f+(p-1)\cdot(q-1)$ safe (for $f$ random in some small interval)? added 978 characters in body |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Is an RSA variant with public exponent $e=f+(p-1)\cdot(q-1)$ safe (for $f$ random in some small interval)? |
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Oct 31 |
answered | How can I prove in zero knowldege that an ElGamal shuffle is correct for a special setting? |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Optimising Pollard's Rho algorithm for large semi-primes |
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Oct 31 |
answered | Distinguish messages |
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Oct 28 |
comment |
What is the complexity of the Square attack against the reduced 4-rounds 128-bit Rijndael variant? Why don't you show us the work you've done so far? You might also want to check out the FAQ, particularly the section titled "Do we accept basic level/homework questions?" and the resources linked to from there |
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Oct 28 |
comment |
Subgroups generators with respect to group generators of composite order curious, I'd also like to point you to the FAQ, particularly the section titled "Do we accept basic level/homework questions?" and the resources linked to from there. |
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Oct 26 |
comment |
Does chaining random number generators lead to loss of randomness? Perfect! Thanks for helping me refine the wording to convey my meaning more clearly, @fgrieu. That's exactly what I meant, but you put it better. |