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  • 32 votes cast
Jul
12
comment Why Elliptic Curves?
very good point !
Jul
9
comment Does SHA-1 meet the strict avalanche criterion?
This technique is efficient to weed out very bad hash function candidates but I doubt it will tell you anything about SHA-1. There was a lot of work put in finding flaws in SHA-1 by actually looking at SHA-1. I don't think you can really expect finding anything looking at SHA-1 as a black box.
Jul
7
comment Does SHA-1 meet the strict avalanche criterion?
I haven't and I don't really see the point : You're only ever going to look at a infinitely small portion of the input space. What this means is that this method doesn't answer your original question which was : "Does SHA-1 meet the strict avalanche criterion?"
Jul
7
comment Does SHA-1 meet the strict avalanche criterion?
Did you do the math on how much computation you would need to do for SHA1 given that its input space consist of all message whose length is smaller than 2^64 ?
Jul
5
answered Do all attacks against PKCS1 v1.5 encryption require an oracle
Jun
23
awarded  Caucus
Jun
23
awarded  Constituent
Apr
14
comment Errata for NIST SP 800-63
Those figures assume that humans pick password randomly. Whether or not the calculus is fine matters less than the fact that this assumption is overly optimistic and should be nixed from any serious document !
Feb
4
comment How fast would a polynomial time factoring algorithm compute?
Maybe that's nitpicking but the distinction is polynomial vs. non-polynomial rather than polynomial vs exponential. We know subexponetial algorithms to factor large numbers as well as finding discrete logarithms in finite fiels.
Jan
27
comment Diffie-Hellman on infinite groups
Is this of any interest beyond theoritical ? Computers are not great at dealing <ith infinite set anyways.
Oct
24
awarded  Yearling
Mar
4
comment Why does CTR mode XOR the plaintext into the output of the block cipher rather than XORing the plaintext into the input of the block cipher?
CTR is designed in this way as a technical equivalent of One TIme Pad where the full entropy random keystream is replaced by a pseudo random generator
Feb
13
comment Pseudo random permutation for arbitrary size domains
If I may extend the question of the OP the paper you cited states that their methods aren't suitable when the domain $X$ is such that $2^{30}<|X|<2^{60}$ and presents that gap as a open problem. Are you aware of subsequent research that solved ?
Jan
8
comment Would data be secure if a cryptographically secure PRNG was used for encryption?
Two things : First it would be somewhat pointless to do on top of AES-[insert-right-mode-of-operation-here] but as long as the AES layer and the PRNG layer are uncorrolated it won't decrease security. Also what you get from your solution is confidentiality which is great but in many situations not enough. For example what is the consequence of a bit flip by an attacker on ciphertext in transit ?
Oct
24
awarded  Yearling
Sep
23
comment Where is the S-Box generated in Rijandel/AES?
Writing a constant time efficient implementation is near impossible BECAUSE of the precomputed S-BOX. Computing an inverse in GF(2^8) on the fly would be way too expensive
Sep
22
comment With a true random number generator at hand, how to implement one-time pad?
This doesn't seem like an awesome idea : as always with OTP key management is the issue. If you're encrypting a message how are you going to get the keystream to Bob. If you're encrypting data at rest on you're hardrive then you need a secure way to keep the keystream which you could have used for the plaintext in the first place...
Sep
9
comment Automated security protocol verification tool for eCK model
I don't know about the first one but the last two work in the symbolic model while the eCK model expresses computational security.
Sep
2
comment Initialization vector in symmetric-key encryption
Could you also specify the data that is being exchanged
Sep
2
comment Initialization vector in symmetric-key encryption
I guess what Ricky is trying to say is : it largely depends on what kind of data is sent...