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| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 7 months |
| seen | 5 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 4 |
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Dec 7 |
awarded | Commentator |
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Dec 7 |
comment |
Factorize RSA knowing several N and E Yeah, like CodesInChaos I would have tried gcd on the modulis... |
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Dec 7 |
comment |
using Post-quantum asymmetric ciphers instead of RSA Hasn't NTRU been broken several time by Faugère's work on Gröbner basis ? |
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Dec 7 |
awarded | Editor |
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Dec 7 |
revised |
Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption? added 208 characters in body |
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Dec 7 |
answered | Why are protocols often proven secure under the random oracle model instead of a hash assumption? |
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Dec 6 |
comment |
Securing a lookup table I think we can sum up Thomas's questions by What security goal are you actually trying to achieve ? |
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Nov 30 |
answered | Stopping timing attacks on AES: Why is it important to prevent the OS from interrupting the AES computation? |
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Nov 29 |
answered | Message authentication codes construction |
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Nov 29 |
awarded | Critic |
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Nov 29 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Nov 29 |
answered | My Hand Cipher, Can some one tell if it secure |
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Nov 29 |
comment |
How to prove membership of a list without disclosing the list members? @poncho When you say there's a leak of information you mean that statistically don't you ? In which case the unlikelihood of a collision becomes irrelevant since statistical operators like correlation do not care about computational hardness. Also I might be mistaken in my reasonning but there is an infinity of $R2'$ such that $hash(A||R2||hash(m))=hash(A||R2'||hash(m))$ and unless the $Ri$'s have a specific structure an attacker would be unable to tell apart the actual $R2$ from any of the other $R2'$. |
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Nov 28 |
answered | What cipher mode is suitable for independantly decryptable short messages? |
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Nov 28 |
comment |
How to prove membership of a list without disclosing the list members? @poncho or we just found a collision for hash... |
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Nov 27 |
comment |
Safety of DSA key parameters sharing Thanks for the reference and for the precision |
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Nov 27 |
comment |
Safety of DSA key parameters sharing This discussion followed from the presentation of the paper Public Keys by Lenstra, Hughes et al at Crypto 2012 but the paper itself doesn't mention DH type keys. As for the "never happens in practice" bit you're probably right. |
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Nov 27 |
answered | Is the AES encryption scheme CPA secure? |
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Nov 27 |
answered | Safety of DSA key parameters sharing |
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Nov 21 |
comment |
How to construct a good PRF from a block cipher? Just curious, what is your distinguisher for your first proposal ? |
