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 Yearling
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  • 10 votes cast
Aug
12
comment Can one construct OTPs without using XOR?
Ah, you're right. I missed that it was also excluded from the message.
Aug
12
comment Can one construct OTPs without using XOR?
You're off by 1 in the prime case of construction 1; 0 has no multiplicative inverse. I think you noted that but then miscounted.
Aug
6
comment SSL pinning - how to safely hide the certificate?
You only need to validate that the client received the correct cert. The server won't send the private key so that can't be part of what the client validates. Consider just using a hash or thumbprint.
Jul
28
comment Why calculate pi to estimate randomness?
@FlorianBourse the binary representability of the value being approximated is not relevant. Simpler tests like checking lsb or msb can be seen as a random estimation of 1/2. And of course the test must be able to evaluate how close the estimate is to pi, so it needs a sufficiently precise representation of the actual value.
Jul
24
comment Can a 1 byte difference in AES 128 bit keys make huge difference in output?
A single bit difference in the key (or the plaintext) should result in a totally unrelated output. Any correlation would be considered a weakness.
Jul
10
comment Salting in asp.net?
A different random salt is generated when the user account is created (or possibly when a password is changed). You typically store it in the database with the password hash. crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1776/…
Jul
7
comment different feistel words in key size
If that is a quote from somewhere, it would help if you linked to the source. "m" doesn't appear in your question, so asking what it means doesn't make sense.
Jun
18
comment What are the differences between collision attack and birthday attack?
The quote from the second Wikipedia page is not very well-written. I'm not sure what it is trying to say.
May
15
comment Practical Uses for Timing Attacks on Hash Comparisons (e.g. MD5)?
There's no timing attack on MD5 as used here because there is no secret to extract. You have provided the password parameter, you know exactly what the internal state of the hash will be through the entire invocation. If you were trying to extract a salt, then maybe you could contemplate a timing attack. @fgrieu is correct about the comparison being vulnerable.
May
6
comment Information-theoretic bound on leakage by timing measurement
That occurred to me too. I figured I'd write up what I had so far.
May
6
answered Information-theoretic bound on leakage by timing measurement
Apr
3
revised Solve a problem, thought it was hash length extension, hours later, am I wrong?
added 316 characters in body
Apr
3
answered Solve a problem, thought it was hash length extension, hours later, am I wrong?
Feb
9
comment Client-Server application how can data be encrypted so only clients can read it
There has to be some kind of authentication framework, since encrypting data is pointless unless you can verify that you're communicating with the correct person. If this is just random strangers sharing data there's no way to tell if one of them is (acting on behalf of) the server.
Feb
6
answered Client-Server application how can data be encrypted so only clients can read it
Jan
30
awarded  Yearling
Jan
30
answered Is there any existing cipher capable of scaling from a 1 bit key up to a one-time-pad?
Jan
22
comment Compact digital signature for noisy data
@fgrieu Reed-Solomon codes are non-binary, I think they can be defined over any $GF(q)$. See Wikipedia
Dec
12
comment Recovering a constant salt for MD5
"I know that the hash is of length 21" - "hash" should be "salt", no?
Dec
2
comment Using the same symmetric key in both directions?
If your attacker can't inject messages then that's not something you have to worry about. TCP provides less of a barrier than you seem to think, though.