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| visits | member for | 6 months |
| seen | Nov 30 '12 at 9:45 | |
| stats | profile views | 1 |
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Nov 29 |
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Message authentication codes construction let us continue this discussion in chat |
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Nov 29 |
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Message authentication codes construction Thanks, but I don't think it's arbitrary. They purposely make the data only 63 bits so that they can prepend the bit. My intuition is that a forgery is possible if r can look like one of the message blocks and they therefore differentiate r from the message blocks with the first bit. The issue is, I don't see how a polynomial time adversary would forge even without this bit. |
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Nov 29 |
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Message authentication codes construction Thank you!! :-) |
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Nov 29 |
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Message authentication codes construction I wasn't referring to the padding. In the scheme itself, they have z=F_a(0.r) XOR F_a(1. <1>.M[1]) XOR F_a(1.<2>.M[2])... |
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Nov 29 |
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Message authentication codes construction Thank you for editing! |
