network profile
| bio | website | |
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| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 6 months |
| seen | Jun 11 at 21:58 | |
| stats | profile views | 0 |
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Jun 10 |
accepted | Is symmetric key encrypted with server's public key secure |
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Jun 10 |
comment |
Is symmetric key encrypted with server's public key secure Thank you for full and comprehensive answer! |
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Jun 8 |
comment |
Is symmetric key encrypted with server's public key secure When Alice first meets Bob, she has to tell him her random chosen persistent secret for Bob to recognize her later - like registration. Bob assumes nothing about Alice upon their first meet. Alice cannot use DH due to MITM threat, so she sends her secret encrypted by Bob's public key - and the only way Mallory could interfere with this is to "register" herself too, without getting access to Alice-Bob communication. They don't use the same session key derived from Alice's secret because I've thought it's safer to choose random key each time. |
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Jun 8 |
comment |
Is symmetric key encrypted with server's public key secure @HennoBrandsma, yes, in original draft authentication is based on shared secret, so if channel is secure, in most trivial case Alice could just send Bob plaintext password. Mallory does not know Alice's random symmetric session key, as it was encrypted for Bob only. If Mallory forges Alice request to hold her key instead of Alice's, Mallory won't be able to forward Bob's response back to Alice, as she does not know original key. Mallory is also unable to obtain shared secret told by Alice to Bob by listening, as it's encrypted by random symmetric key, which Mallory was unable to retrieve. |
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Jun 8 |
asked | Is symmetric key encrypted with server's public key secure |
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Dec 20 |
awarded | Student |
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Dec 6 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Dec 6 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Dec 6 |
accepted | Speeding up partially known plaintext preimage recovery attack on MD5 |
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Dec 6 |
comment |
Speeding up partially known plaintext preimage recovery attack on MD5 Sad to admit you both are completely right, so no donuts for me. |
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Dec 6 |
awarded | Editor |
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Dec 6 |
comment |
Speeding up partially known plaintext preimage recovery attack on MD5 I've initially come up with an idea that it's possible to create better (in any definition of "better") algorithm when input is partially known. Please see my question updated for an idea I'm going to implement, but unsure if am I not reinventing the wheel and similar attempt was already done and proven unsuccessful? |
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Dec 6 |
revised |
Speeding up partially known plaintext preimage recovery attack on MD5 added 3383 characters in body |
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Dec 5 |
asked | Speeding up partially known plaintext preimage recovery attack on MD5 |
